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Abstract
Financial Reporting Quality and Corporate Bond Markets
Mingzhi LIU, Ph.D.
Concordia University, 2011
Recent research proposes that financial reporting is actually shaped by debt 
markets instead of by equity markets. As noted by Baker, Greenwood and Wurgler 
(2003), “Relative to the literature on equity financing patterns, and relative to the actual 
importance of debt finance in the U.S. economy, the literature on debt financing patterns 
is surprisingly underdeveloped”. Hence, the interface between financial reporting and 
debt financing has recently emerged as a fruitful idea for research. In fact, because of 
their asymmetric payoff function and fixed claims on corporate assets, creditors have 
stronger incentives than equity investors to demand high quality financial reporting.
In this dissertation, I build up alternative arguments for conservatism that can be 
applied to the public bond market and cannot be generalized to the private debt market or 
the equity market. For instance, Merton’s (1974) theoretical bond pricing model indicates 
that equity holders and bondholders value a firm’s operating volatility in different ways.
Thus, bond and equity investors could have different expectations and needs regarding 
what they consider to be useful financial reporting. In that regard, recent evidence on the 
interface between financial reporting quality and debt markets largely focuses on private 
bank loan contracting. However, in terms of providing capital to corporations, public debt 
markets are as large as private debt markets, with substantial differences in terms of 
monitoring efficiency, private information availability, seniority in liquidation, and re-
iv
contracting flexibility. Hence, public bondholders can value financial reporting quality in 
a way that differs from private debt holders’ perspective.
Using accounting conservatism and internal control effectiveness as proxies for 
financial reporting quality, I investigate two sets of research questions that relate to the 
effects of financial reporting quality on corporate bond financing. I consider both 
conditional and unconditional conservatism. Conditional conservatism depends upon 
future economic circumstances and reflects the writing down of book values under 
sufficiently adverse circumstances while not allowing their writing up under favorable 
circumstances (e.g., lower of cost or market for inventories). Unconditional conservatism 
reflects the consistent application of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
that reduces earnings independent of future economic events, resulting in the book value 
of net assets being understated due to predetermined aspects of the accounting process 
(e.g., immediate expensing of R&D expenditures according to U.S. GAAP). First, I
investigate the main effect of accounting conservatism and the moderating effect of
internal control effectiveness on the yield spread of new corporate bond issues. Second, I
assess the main effect of accounting conservatism and internal control effectiveness on 
the underpricing of newly issued corporate bonds. Both yield spreads and underpricing 
reflect different market realities. While the yield spread of new corporate bond issues is 
determined through negotiations among bond issuers, investment bankers and large 
institutional investors the underpricing of newly issued corporate bonds reflects the 
responses of all bond investors based on their assessment of the available information.
My main empirical findings are: (1) conditional conservative reporting relates to 
higher yield spreads in new corporate bond issues; (2) unconditional conservative 
vreporting relates to lower yield spreads in new corporate bond issues; (3) ineffective 
internal controls enhance the effect of conditional conservative reporting to raise the yield 
spread; (4) both conditional and unconditional conservative reporting relate to the 
underpricing of newly issued corporate bonds. However, internal control effectiveness 
does not seem to matter in the underpricing.
This dissertation mainly contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, 
this study extends the conservatism literature by linking conservative reporting to
corporate bond financing patterns. With theoretical arguments and empirical evidence 
that are inconsistent with the debt contracting efficiency view of conservatism, my study
casts some doubt as to how generalizable is the traditional debt contracting efficiency 
argument regarding the interface between conservatism and the cost of debt. Second, 
research on Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s internal control provisions needs to go beyond the
equity holders’ and private debt holders’ perspectives, and consider other financial 
stakeholders who contract on the basis of financial statements. This dissertation fills the
void in the internal control literature by providing initial empirical evidence as to how
internal control effectiveness affects corporate bond financing.
Key Words: Accounting Conservatism; Internal Control Effectiveness; Information 
Asymmetry; Yield Spread; Underpricing
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1Chapter 1 Introduction
Most prior research assumes that the information needs of equity markets’ 
participants determine corporate financial reporting. However, Lev (1989) challenges the 
usefulness of accounting earnings to equity markets. He argues that the biased accounting 
measurement principles result in low information content of reported earnings. This 
justifies the weak predictability of earnings to stock prices and returns. More recently, 
Ball and Shivakumar (2008), and Ball, Robin and Sadka (2008b) argue that debt markets 
rather than equity markets actually shape financial reporting. Debt contracts include 
accounting numbers that are used by creditors to predict future cash flows, assess the 
default risk of debt issuers, as well as monitor the behavior of managements. Debt 
financing represents the predominant source of external funding for U.S. corporations 
(Denis and Mihov 2003). In fact, the total value of U.S. corporate debt issuance
(including private and public debt) between 1991 and 2009 amounts to about $22.9
trillion, while the total value of equity issuance (including common and preferred stock) 
for the same period represents only about $3.2 trillion.1 Furthermore, as noted by Baker et 
al. (2003), “Relative to the literature on equity financing patterns, and relative to the 
actual importance of debt finance in the U.S. economy, the literature on debt financing 
patterns is surprisingly underdeveloped.” Hence, the interface between financial reporting 
and debt financing has recently emerged as a fruitful focus for research. In fact, 
considering their asymmetric payoff function and fixed claims on corporate assets, 
                                                
1 Data source: Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (http://www.sifma.org).
2creditors have stronger incentives than equity investors to demand high-quality financial 
reporting (Ball, Bushman and Vasvari 2008a).2
According to statistics by the Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association, the total value of U.S. new corporate public debt issues during 1991-2009 is 
about $11.4 trillion, representing almost half of U.S. corporate debt financing during the 
same period. However, current research on debt markets focuses largely on the effect of 
financial reporting quality on private debt contracting (Ball et al. 2008a; Graham, Li and 
Qiu 2008; Wittenberg-Moerman 2008; Zhang 2008; Sunder, Sunder and Zhang 2009; 
Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman 2011; Kim, Song and Zhang 2011). Overall, these 
studies conclude that high financial reporting quality decreases the cost of private bank 
loan financing. By contrast, little is known about the effect of financial reporting quality 
on public bond financing (Mansi, Maxwell and Miller 2004, 2011; Nikolaev 2010).
As noted by Holthausen and Watts (2001), “It is not apparent that the relevance of 
a given number would be the same for equity investors and lenders, and what is relevant 
for one user or user group, may not be relevant for another”. The relative scant evidence 
on the relationship between financial reporting and corporate debt financing, as well as 
the focus on private debt financing, raise several questions. For instance, Merton’s (1974) 
theoretical bond pricing model indicates that equity holders and bondholders value a 
firm’s operating volatility in different ways. More specifically, Bessembinder and 
Maxwell (2008) point out that bond is issued by a corporation at different point of time 
with distinct contracts that differ in terms of bond features and that are traded separately. 
From this perspective, corporate bonds differ substantially from common equities. Hence, 
                                                
2 Ball et al. (2008b) provide empirical evidence that accounting conservatism is actually shaped by debt 
markets but not by equity markets.
3bond and equity investors could have different expectations and needs regarding what 
they consider to be useful financial reporting. In addition, the literature indicates that 
public and private debt financings differ substantially in terms of monitoring efficiency 
(Diamond 1984, 1991; Rajan 1992), private information availability (Fama 1985; 
Bhattacharya and Chiesa 1995), seniority in liquidation (Carey 1995; Welch 1997), and 
renegotiation flexibility (Bharath, Sunder and Sunder 2008). Therefore, conclusions 
drawn from research on private debt contracts can not be a reliable indication as to how 
public debt markets interact with financial reporting.
This dissertation uses conservative reporting and internal controls as proxies for 
financial reporting quality. Mueller (1964) indicates that the lower of cost or market 
method is the most widely used accounting practice. In addition, Sterling (1967) regards 
conservatism as the most influential and pervasive principle of valuation in traditional 
accounting. Basu (1997) overcomes the measurement problem of conservatism. Since 
then, researchers have introduced various measures of conservatism and empirically 
tested various conservatism-related research questions. Among the four widely 
recognized explanations for accounting conservatism (contracting, litigation, regulation, 
and taxation) (Watts 2003a, 2003b), contracting, especially debt contracting, is the most 
influential and intensively studied one. Accounting conservatism mitigates information 
asymmetries among contracting parties, and thus alleviates adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems as indicated by Jensen and Meckling (1976).
Recent corporate scandals such as Enron, WorldCom, Nortel, and Parmalat re-
emphasize the importance of conservatism in alleviating the expropriation of corporate 
4resources.3 These financial scandals also indicate the breakdown in corporate internal 
controls and the lack of adequate corporate governance mechanisms. Rational investors 
would require higher risk premiums on their investment to compensate the increased
uncertainty in estimating corporate performance. The officially stated purpose of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 was to protect investors by improving the accuracy 
and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws. The Act 
comprises various provisions targeting corporate accounting oversight, auditor
independence, corporate responsibility, and enhanced financial disclosures and so on. The 
endless debates on the cost and benefit of SOX internal control provisions (especially 
Section 404) make it the most controversial ones among SOX provisions. Policymakers 
advocate that internal control provisions can eventually generate high quality financial 
reporting, which will lower cost of capital (U.S. House of Representatives 2005). 
In this dissertation, I develop alternative arguments for conservatism that can be 
applied to the public bond market and cannot be generalized to the private debt market or 
the equity market. More specifically, I investigate the effects of financial reporting 
quality, as proxied by accounting conservatism and internal control effectiveness, on the 
cost of publicly issued corporate bonds from two perspectives: the yield spread of new 
corporate bond issues and the underpricing of corporate bonds that start trading on the 
market. In the new corporate bond issue market, the negotiation among bond issuers, 
investment bankers, and large institutional investors determines the yield spread of new 
bond issues. While, in the seasoned bonds market, the underpricing of newly issued 
                                                
3 More specifically, Enron and Parmalat inflated their earnings by relying on large related party 
transactions, while WorldCom hid a deteriorating operating performance by capitalizing maintenance and 
repair expenses. Nortel booked several billion of assets which were quickly shown to be worthless and 
overstated its 2000 sales by 11%. 
5bonds reflects the responses of all bond investors based on their assessment of the 
available information.
For the purpose of the thesis, I consider both conditional and unconditional 
conservatism. Conditional conservatism depends upon future economic circumstances 
and reflects the writing down of book values under sufficiently adverse circumstances 
while not allowing their writing up under favorable circumstances (e.g., lower of cost or 
market for inventories). Unconditional conservatism reflects the consistent application of 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) that reduces earnings independent of 
future economic events, resulting in the book value of net assets being understated due to 
predetermined aspects of the accounting process (e.g., immediate expensing of R&D 
Expenditures according to U.S. GAAP) (Beaver and Ryan, 2005).
First, in Chapter 3, I investigate the main effect of accounting conservatism on the 
yield spread of new corporate bond issues. In addition, I take into consideration the 
moderating effect of internal control effectiveness on the above main effect. Such 
analysis seeks to answer the following four research questions: (1) Whether and to what 
extent does conditional and unconditional conservative reporting influence the yield 
spread of new corporate bond issues? (2) Whether there exists an interaction effect 
between conservative reporting and internal control effectiveness on the yield spread of 
new corporate bond issues? The traditional debt contracting efficiency view of 
conservatism suggests that conditional conservatism lowers, and unconditional 
conservatism has no impact on the yield spread of new corporate bond issues. By contrast, 
I also provide alternative predictions that conditional (unconditional) conservative 
reporting relates to higher (lower) yield spreads in new corporate bond issues. 
6Inconsistent with the debt contracting efficiency view of conservatism, empirical 
evidence suggests that issuers with lower (higher) level of conditional (unconditional) 
conservative reporting can issue bonds at a lower yield spread. In addition, I find that
ineffective internal controls enhance the effect of conditional conservatism to raise the 
yield spread. 
Second, in Chapter 4, I investigate the effect of accounting conservatism and 
internal control effectiveness on the underpricing of newly issued corporate bonds. More 
specifically, I investigate the flowing research questions: (1) Whether and to what extent 
does conditional and unconditional conservative reporting affect the underpricing of 
newly issued corporate bonds? (2) Whether and to what extent does internal control 
effectiveness affect the underpricing of newly issued corporate bonds? Following 
signaling argument of underpricing and consistent with the hypotheses in Chapter 3 that 
both conditional and unconditional conservative reporting proxy for information 
asymmetry, I predict that issuers with more conditional and unconditional conservative 
reporting relate to more underpricing for newly issued bonds to distinguish them with 
issuers will less conservative reporting. Empirical results indicate that both conditional 
and unconditional conservative reporting increase the abnormal return of newly issued
bonds. To the extent that internal control effectiveness proxies for information risk, the 
information argument of underpricing predicts that issuers with more internal control 
problems will experience more underpricing. However, I find that there is no significant 
difference in terms of the underpricing of newly issued corporate bonds between issuers 
with and without effective internal controls. 
7This dissertation contributes to the existing literature along the following 
dimensions. First, I rely on accounting conservatism to explain the financing patterns of 
corporate bond markets. This study provides theoretical argument and empirical evidence 
that is contrary to the traditional debt contracting efficiency view of conservatism (Ball 
and Shivakumar 2005). My results cast some doubt as to how generalizable the debt 
contracting efficiency argument is with regard to the interface between accounting 
conservatism and the cost of debt. On one hand, although recognized as “high” financial 
reporting quality by private debt holders from the debt contracting efficiency perspective, 
it is interesting to note that conditional conservatism can be valued negatively in 
corporate bond markets. On the other hand, viewed as “useless” financial reporting 
quality by private debt holders from a debt contracting efficiency standpoint (Ball and 
Shivakumar 2005; Beaver and Ryan 2005), unconditional conservatism can be valued 
positively in corporate bond markets.
Second, as noted by Holthausen and Watts (2001), the level of relevance for 
financial reporting numbers varies among users (e.g., shareholders, creditors). However, 
the existing literature largely focuses on equity markets and private debt markets, and 
provides limited empirical evidence with regard to the effect of financial reporting quality 
on public debt markets. Prior studies only use financial reporting quality proxies (audit 
quality, analyst forecast, and operating accruals) that do not directly relate to the debt 
contracting context to explain the price terms of public bond financing (Mansi et al. 2004; 
Bharath et al. 2008; Mansi et al. 2011). This study complements the bond financing
8literature by using a financial reporting attribute (conservatism) that is closely related to 
debt financing context to explain the price terms of corporate bond financing patterns4.
Third, integrating the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence from the 
accounting and finance literatures, my dissertation provides cross-disciplinary 
explanations for corporate bond financing patterns. Based on information related 
arguments for bond underpricing, I provide hypotheses for the effect of conservatism and 
internal control effectiveness on the underpricing of newly issued corporate bonds. My 
dissertation complements the related literature by using financial reporting quality as a 
proxy for information risk to explain the underpricing of newly issued corporate bonds
(Cai, Helwege and Warga 2007).
Fourth, the SOX internal control literature focuses on the main effect of internal 
control effectiveness on accruals quality, analyst forecast behavior, cost of equity, private 
bank loan contracting, management forecast, and stock return (Doyle, Ge and McVay
2007a; Beneish, Billings and Hodder 2008; Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney and 
LaFond 2009; Costello and Witternberg-Moerman 2011; Feng, Li and McVay 2009; Kim, 
Song and Zhang 2009). However, little is known about the effect of internal control
effectiveness on corporate bond markets.5 Research of SOX internal control provisions 
needs to go beyond the equity holders’ and private debt holders’ perspective and consider 
other financial stakeholders who contract on the basis of financial statements. This 
dissertation fills the void in the internal control literature by providing empirical evidence 
                                                
4 Nikolaev (2010) documents the relation between conditional conservatism and non-price term of 
corporate bond financing. However, as suggested by Bharath et al. (2008) accounting quality only affect the 
price term of public debt financing.
5 One possible explanation is that most of the U.S. corporate bond issuers are large companies with 
effective internal controls. The number of bond issuers that actually disclosed internal control weaknesses
under SOX provisions is limited. Another possibility is that large proportion of U.S. corporate bond issuers 
are privately-held companies and these companies are not obliged to disclose their internal control 
problems under SOX provisions. 
9as to the moderating effect of internal control effectiveness on the yield spread of new 
corporate bond issues.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides 
institutional background of accounting conservatism, internal controls, and corporate 
bond markets. Chapter 3 develops hypotheses, discusses the methodologies, and presents 
empirical results for the effect of financial reporting quality on the yield spread of new 
corporate bond issues. Chapter 4 develops hypotheses, discusses the methodologies, and 
summarizes empirical results for the effect of financial reporting quality on the 
underpricing of newly issued corporate bonds. Chapter 5 interprets the findings of this 
dissertation and draws the conclusion.
10
Chapter 2 Accounting Conservatism, Internal Controls and Bond 
Markets
2.1 Accounting Conservatism
2.1.1 History and Definition of Conservatism
Luca Pacioli’s publication in 1494, introducing the structure of the double-entry 
bookkeeping system, is widely recognized as the milestone of modern accounting.6 Since 
then, double-entry bookkeeping has evolved as the ultimate accounting tool to record 
transactions. However, its development and eventual dominance closely parallels the 
emergence of another influential accounting concept—conservatism. According to 
Littleton (1941), evidence on conservative accounting practices is found in the early 
fifteenth century, which is even before the introduction of double-entry bookkeeping 
system. May (1943) describes the lower of cost or market value as one of the oldest 
accounting practices. The earliest evidence of the adoption of the lower of cost or market 
method was documented in 1406 in an Italian merchant’s, Francesco di Marco, account 
books recording inventory.7 Since then, conservative accounting practices have expanded 
and survived for more than six hundred years. Mueller (1964) indicates that the lower of 
cost or market method is the most widely used accounting practice. In addition, Sterling 
(1967) regards conservatism as the most influential and pervasive principle of valuation 
in traditional accounting. Staubus (1985) suggests that conservatism provides the basis 
for 10 out of 32 accounting measurement methods. Recent empirical evidence shows that 
                                                
6 Pacioli, L. 1494. Summa de Arithmetica, geometria, Proprotioni et Proportionalita: Distintio Nona-
Tractatus XI. Particularis de computis et scripturis. Paganino de Paganini, Venice.
7 According to Vance (1943), Francesco di Marco was the head of extensive trading, banking and cloth-
making enterprises at that time.
11
there is an increasing trend of conservatism over time. Basu (1997), Givoly and Hayn 
(2000), and Holthausen and Watts (2001) find that the coefficients on the bad news 
dummy (incremental timeliness of bad news over good news) have dramatically 
increased during their sample periods. 8 In addition, accounting conservatism is not 
limited to U.S. corporations. It is pervasive for corporations all over the world (Pope and 
Walker 1999; Ball, Kothari and Robin 2000; Ball, Robin and Wu 2003; Ball and 
Shivakumar 2005; Bushman and Piotroski 2006).
In an early accounting textbook (Bliss 1924) defines conservatism as “anticipate 
no profit, but anticipate all losses”. Devine (1963, p.130) provides the first extensive 
review of the conservatism literature and describes conservatism as “… select a whole 
collection of actions from the possibilities and decide which ones would lead to less 
optimism on all kinds of goal-seeking fronts.” Watts and Zimmerman (1986, p.205) 
offers a more detailed guidance of conservatism: “… report the lowest value among the 
possible alternative values for assets and the highest alternative value for liabilities. 
Revenues should be recognized later rather than sooner and expenses sooner than later.” 
Basu (1997, p.7) interprets the practice of conservatism as “accountants’ tendency to 
require a higher degree of verification to recognize good news as gains than to recognize 
bad news as losses.” Building on arguments from prior studies, Givoly and Hayn (2000, 
p.292) regard conservatism as the choices among accounting methods that lead to the 
“minimization of cumulative reported earnings by slower revenue recognition, faster 
expense recognition, lower asset valuation, and higher liability valuation.” Watts (2003a, 
                                                
8 The sample period for Basu (1997) is 1963-1990, for Givoly and Hayn (2000) is 1950-1998, and for 
Holthausen and Watts (2001) is 1927-1993.
12
p.207) briefly defines conservatism as the “differential verifiability required for 
recognition of profits versus losses.”
Hence, there is no formal agreed-upon definition for conservatism even though it 
has existed for more than six hundred years. In practice, accountants interpret and apply 
the conservatism principle based on their own reasoning. Similarly, researchers define 
and measure conservatism based on their research questions. The practice of 
conservatism involves a large number of accounting methods and estimations. The lower 
of cost or market for inventories, LIFO inventory costing method (assuming increasing 
inventory costs), expensing R&D and advertising expenditures, and accelerated 
amortization are examples of conservative accounting methods. Underestimates of assets, 
revenue or gains, and overestimates of liabilities, expenses or losses are examples of 
conservative accounting estimations. 
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) defines conservatism as “A 
prudent reaction to uncertainty to try to ensure that uncertainty and risks inherent in 
business situations are adequately considered.” In addition, FASB comments that 
“conservatism tends to conflict with significant qualitative characteristics, such as 
representational faithfulness, neutrality, and comparability (including consistency)” 
(Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No.2 1980, p.36). Former Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) Chair Arthur Levitt (1998) implicitly criticizes the practice 
of conservatism by advocating “Good accounting standards produce financial statements 
that report events in the period in which they occur, not before and not after.” The 
potential negative effect of conservatism on equity markets (Holthausen and Watts 2001) 
13
and U.S. regulatory authorities’ long standing “equity market orientation” justify their 
anti-conservatism position.
2.1.2 Contracting Demand for Conservatism
Watts (2003a) discusses four widely recognized demands for accounting 
conservatism: contracting, litigation, taxation, and regulation. For the purpose of this 
dissertation, contracting demand for conservatism is discussed in more details.
Using conservatism for contracting purpose is a very old practice that has existed
for many centuries (Watts and Zimmerman 1983). Holthausen and Watts (2001) 
document that conservatism predates formal accounting standard setting in the first half 
of the twentieth century and before the increased popularity of litigation in the late 1960s. 
Contracting is widely accepted as the incipient demand for conservatism. Agency theory 
is a good starting point to understand the contracting demand for conservatism. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976, p.310) suggest that “Contractual relations are the essence of the 
firm.” One can regard a firm as a group of people with contracts. Due to the information 
asymmetry between agents and principals, and the limited liability and tenure of agents, 
agents (e.g. managers of the firm) have strong incentives to engage in opportunistic 
behaviors to maximize their own benefits at the expense of other contracting parties 
(principals, e.g. shareholders and creditors). Rational principals would take actions to 
protect themselves from agents’ potential opportunistic behaviors. Consequently, 
managers bear the agency costs arising from their potential opportunistic behaviors 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976). Thus, managers have incentives to reduce agency costs by 
allowing other contracting parties to monitor and restrict their opportunistic behaviors. In 
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practice, uninformed contracting parties use accounting numbers to monitor and restrict 
managers’ opportunistic behaviors (Watts and Zimmerman 1986). 9 Thus, accounting 
conservatism serves as a platform for efficient contracting (Watts 2003a), especially 
when managers have strong incentives to overstate accounting numbers through their 
discretionary choices.
In a debt contracting context, managers have incentives to opportunistically 
transfer wealth from creditors to shareholders through risky payout policies and 
investment decisions (Watts and Zimmerman 1986). Accounting conservatism increases 
the probability of contractual violation, and prevents unintended wealth transfers through 
excessive dividends and risky investments (Myers 1977; Smith and Warner 1979). In 
addition, creditors’ asymmetric payoff functions may justify debt contracting demand of 
conservatism. According to Watts (2003a), creditors have asymmetric payoff with respect
to net assets of the firm: at the maturity of the debt, if the firm’s net assets are above the 
face value of debt, creditors do not receive any additional payment. However, when 
managers of the firm cannot produce enough net assets to repay the promised amounts
(interest and principal) to creditors at maturity, limited liability would cause creditors to 
receive less than the contracted sum. Accordingly, creditors require lower bound measure 
of verifiable net assets to guarantee that the verifiable net assets are at least greater than 
the present value of future repayment of interest and principal. 
In addition, some studies provide empirical evidence to support the debt 
contracting demand for conservatism (Ahmed, Billings, Merton and Stanford-Harris
2002; Zhang 2008). Ahmed et al. (2002) investigate the role of accounting conservatism 
                                                
9 For example, in debt contracts, creditors require firms to maintain a minimum level of net assets to 
guarantee the future repayment of interest and principal. In compensation contracts, earnings-related figures 
are included in performance measurement index to calculate management’s bonus.
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in reducing the cost of debt and in mitigating bondholder-shareholder conflicts over 
dividend policy. They find that firms with more conservative reporting have lower cost of 
debt, and firms with more severe conflicts with regard to dividend policy report more 
conservatively. Zhang (2008) provides empirical evidence that accounting conservatism 
benefits both lenders and borrowers during the debt contracting processes. More 
specifically, lenders benefit ex post through the timely signaling of default risk and 
borrowers benefit ex ante through lower cost of debt. 
In addition to debt contracting demand, the existing literature documents the 
following alternative explanations for accounting conservatism: compensation, litigation, 
taxation, and political cost. First, limited tenure and liability motivate managers to 
overstate accounting numbers in order to increase their compensation. However, 
conservative reporting restricts compensation overpayment to managers. Second, 
overstatement of net assets may increase managers’ and auditors’ litigation risk. Thus, 
conservative reporting helps them to reduce potential litigation costs. Third, conservative 
reporting reduces the present value of income taxes for profitable firms. Profitable firms 
defer income taxes to future period, which potentially increase the value of the firms. 
Fourth, regulators face asymmetric loss functions. They would be criticized more if the 
accounting standards they establish favor overstatement of net assets rather than 
understatement of net assets. Watts (2003a) provides more detailed review of these 
alternative explanations for conservatism.
2.1.3 Classification of Conservatism
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While the existing literature recognizes two kinds of conservatism, it relies on
different terminologies to characterize the dichotomy: conditional and unconditional 
conservatism (Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Beaver and Ryan 2005); or ex post and ex ante 
conservatism (Richardson and Tinaikar 2004); or accounting choice driven and 
accounting principal driven conservatism (Bagnoli and Watts 2005); or news dependent 
and news independent conservatism (Chandra, Wasley and Waymire 2004); or income 
statement and balance sheet conservatism (Pea, Thornton and Welker 2005). Consistent 
with Beaver and Ryan (2005), I use conditional and unconditional conservatism 
throughout this dissertation.
Conditional conservatism depends upon future economic circumstances. Beaver 
and Ryan (2005, p.269) define conditional conservatism as “book values are written 
down under sufficiently adverse circumstances but not written up under favorable 
circumstances.” This definition is consistent with Basu’s (1997) notion of 
conservatism—timely loss recognition. Examples of conditional conservatism are 
adoption of the lower of cost or market method for inventory and impairment write-down 
for long-term tangible and intangible assets (Beaver and Ryan 2005). Future economic 
events trigger the write-down of assets under conditional conservatism. Accordingly,
some researchers call it “news dependent” or “ex post” conservatism. 
Consistent application of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) that 
reduces earnings independent of future economic events results in unconditional 
conservatism. Beaver and Ryan (2005, p.269) define unconditional conservatism as “the 
book value of net assets is understated due to predetermined aspects of the accounting 
process.” This definition is consistent with Beaver and Ryan (2000) notion of 
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conservatism—biased underestimation of book value. Beaver and Ryan (2005) suggest
that immediate expensing of internally developed intangible assets, amortizing property, 
plant and equipment faster than economic depreciation, and recording positive net present 
value projects at historical cost are examples of unconditional conservatism. The writing
down of assets under this type of conservatism is predetermined and independent of 
future economic events, thus some researchers name it “news independent” or “ex ante” 
conservatism. 
Contracting theory predicts that conditional conservatism and unconditional 
conservatism play substantially different roles in enhancing contracting efficiency. 
According to Ball and Shivakumar (2005), only conditional conservatism signals new 
information to creditors and thus enhances contracting efficiency since timely loss 
recognition reflects contemporaneous economic shocks. In a private debt contracting 
context, conditional conservatism quickly triggers debt covenant violations and transfers 
decision rights from managers to creditors. Therefore, creditors can use these decision 
rights to restrict managers’ opportunistic behaviors. In a public debt contracting context, 
conditional conservatism provides a timely signal to decrease bondholders’ expectation 
about the firm’s future cash flows. Hence, bondholders can quickly respond to timely loss 
recognition by marking down bond prices. Thus, managers have to restrict their
opportunistic behaviors in order to prevent potential negative bond price reactions. In 
contrast, unconditional conservatism cannot increase contracting efficiency because it 
seems “inefficient or at best neutral in contracting” (Ball and Shivakumar 2005, p.91). 
More specifically, unconditional conservatism is only a downward accounting bias 
without adjusting the effect of contemporaneous economic events. Thus, contracting 
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parties can adjust for unconditional conservatism ex ante. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) 
suggest that contract terms can be written to reverse the effect of accounting methods that 
result in unconditional conservatism.10 Basu (2005) provides an argument to corroborate 
Ball and Shivakumar’s (2005) view. He uses historical evidence to suggest that 
unconditional conservatism is mainly used for regulatory or tax purposes, such as 
expensing of R&D expenditures as required by SFAS and accelerating amortization for 
tax incentives. Qiang (2007) investigates whether previously proposed four demands for 
accounting conservatism apply to conditional and unconditional conservatism 
respectively. Her findings indicate that contracting demand only induces conditional 
conservatism, while regulation and taxation demands induce unconditional conservatism
only.
2.2 Internal Controls
2.2.1 Institutional Background of Internal Controls
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA) is the first statutory regulation 
of internal controls in the pre-SOX period. The Act requires SEC registrants to develop 
and maintain cost effective internal control system. However, without detailed guidance 
and benchmark, the term “cost effective” is ambiguous, which results in weak 
implementation (Kinney, Maher and Wright 1990).11 Later, the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission 1992 (COSO) developed Internal Control –
Integrated Framework, which provides detailed guidance for internal controls. It defines 
                                                
10 For example, if book values of assets are consistently understated by a known amount, then in debt 
covenants, agent can require an increase to the book values by this amount when determining the total 
amount the firm can borrow without affecting pricing and non-pricing terms (Ball and Shivakumar 2005).
11 FCPA does not require management to evaluate or certify the effectiveness of internal control.
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internal control as “a process, affected by an entity’s board of directors, management and 
other personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of 
objectives in the effectiveness and efficiency of operations; reliability of financial 
reporting, and compliance with applicable laws and regulations”. The Integrated 
Framework suggests five components of internal control: the control environment, risk 
assessments, control activities, information and communication, and monitoring.
Starting from Enron in 2001, a series of corporate financial scandals exposed 
serious deficiencies in corporate internal control systems and the lack of adequate 
corporate governance mechanisms. To restore the confidence of market participants and 
maintain the stability of U.S. capital markets, the U.S. Congress passed the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX) in January 23, 2002. President Bush described the legislation as the 
“most far-reaching reforms of American business practices” since the Great Depression
(Hitt 2002).12 The SOX comprises various provisions targeting corporate accounting 
oversight, audit independence, corporate responsibility, and enhanced financial 
disclosures and so on. The SOX created a non-profit organization, the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), to oversee the auditors of public companies. 
Later, the PCAOB issued Auditing Standard No. 2 (AS2) in 2004 as guidance for 
management and the external auditor evaluating corporation’s internal control 
effectiveness.13 To alleviate the financial burden on public firms, the PCAOB released a 
more principle-based Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5) in 2007 to supersede AS2.  
                                                
12 At that time, Franklin D. Roosevelt presided over an expansion of regulation that included establishing 
the Securities and Exchange Commission.
13 Auditing Standards No. 2 (PCAOB 2004) defines internal control over financial reporting as, “A process 
designed by, or under the supervision of, the company's principal executive and principal financial officers, 
or persons performing similar functions, and effected by the company's board of directors, management, 
and other personnel, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the 
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The SOX internal control provisions (Section 302 and Section 404) integrate the 
terminologies and frameworks developed by FCPA, COSO, and PCAOB.14 Specifically, 
SOX Section 302 requires chief executive and financial officers to certify, in each 
quarterly and annual report, that they are responsible for establishing and maintaining 
internal controls. In addition, they are required to certify that they have evaluated the 
internal controls and presented in reports their conclusion with regard to the effectiveness 
of the internal controls “as of a date within 90 days prior to the report”. The SOX Section 
302 requirements are effective after August 29, 2002 for all quarterly and annual filings. 
Furthermore, SOX Section 404 not only requires chief executive and financial 
officers to evaluate and report internal controls, but also requires independent auditors to 
attest the accuracy of management’s report and to provide their own evaluation on 
internal controls. Thus, external auditors must collect sufficient evidence to evaluate the 
effectiveness of internal controls. SOX Section 404 applies to all U.S. public companies 
except for registered investment companies and issuers of asset-backed securities. The 
requirements are effective for accelerated registrants with fiscal year ends after June 15, 
2004 and for non-accelerated registrants with fiscal year ends after April 15, 2005 (SEC 
2003).15 Later, the compliance dates were extended to November 15, 2004 for accelerated 
registrants and July 15, 2005 for non-accelerated filers. Subsequently, the compliance 
dates for non-accelerated filers were extended to July 15, 2006.
                                                                                                                                                 
preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles”.
14 In fact, before SOX internal control provisions, the SEC attempted to obtain approval to require 
mandatory internal control reports by all public firms but with little progress. 
15 Accelerated registrants must meet all the following criteria: (1) market value of voting and non-voting 
common equity held by non-affiliates exceeding $75 million; (2) trading on public exchange for at least 12 
months; and (3) previously filed at least one annual report.
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The policymakers advocate that effective internal controls are necessary to restore 
and reinforce investors’ confidence in financial statements, which is essential to the 
vitality and stability of the capital markets (SEC 2002; SEC 2006). In addition they 
emphasize that internal control provisions can eventually generate high quality financial 
reporting, which will lower cost of capital (U.S. House of Representatives 2005). SEC 
Commissioner Cynthia A. Glassman points out that “If investors lose faith in the 
accuracy and completeness of companies’ financial statements and other disclosures, they 
will be less willing to invest, and our financial markets will suffer” (SEC 2006). 
Consistent with the above arguments, the academic literature documents that effective 
internal controls positively affect accruals quality, analyst forecast behavior, management 
forecast, and stock return, and negatively affect cost of capital and cost of bank loan
(Doyle et al. 2007a; Ogneva, Subramanyam and Raghunandan 2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife, 
Collins, Kinney and LaFond 2008; Beneish et al. 2008; Hammersley, Myers and 
Shakespeare 2008; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009; Feng et al. 2009; Costello and 
Witternberg-Moerman 2011; Kim et al. 2009, 2011). 
Even with the previously discussed benefits, SOX internal control provisions, 
especially Section 404, are the most controversial ones among SOX provisions. The main 
controversy relates to the high compliance costs. Opponents of the provisions argue that 
its high costs are not commensurate with the corresponding benefits. A recent survey 
indicates that Fortune 1000 companies spent $5.9 million, on average, to comply with 
Section 404 (Charles River Associates 2005). This number is much greater than what the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) initially predicted--$91,000 (SEC 2003). In 
addition, a survey by the Financial Executives Institute shows that 94 percent of the 
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participants indicated that the compliance costs for SOX internal control provisions 
outweigh the benefits (Financial Executives Institute 2005). Some SEC registrants 
complained about the high compliance costs and called for the revision of the SOX 
internal control provisions (American Electronics Association 2005). This may explain 
the subsequent extension of the compliance dates of SOX Section 404. Also, 
policymakers held hearings on the high compliance costs with regard to the SOX internal 
control provisions (U.S. Senate 2004; U.S. House of Representatives 2005). Facing the 
demands for loosening the requirements of SOX internal control provisions, the SEC 
conducted a cost-benefit analysis of the audit of internal controls as mandated by SOX 
Section 404 (SEC 2008). 
2.2.2 Empirical Evidence of SOX Internal Controls
The passage of SOX internal control provisions (Section 302 and Section 404) 
generates great research opportunities. There exist two research streams with regard to 
the SOX internal control provisions. One stream focuses on the economic factors that 
determine internal control weaknesses (Ge and McVay 2005; Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins 
and Kinney 2007; Doyle, Ge and McVay 2007b; Hoitash, Hoitash and Bedard 2009). 
Another stream investigates the economic consequences of internal control weaknesses
(Doyle et al. 2007a; Ogneva et al. 2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008; Beneish et al. 
2008; Hammersley et al. 2008; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009; Feng et al. 2009; Costello 
and Witternberg-Moerman 2011; Kim et al. 2009, 2011). 
The first research stream examines whether certain firm characteristics affect 
internal control weaknesses (Ge and McVay 2005; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle 
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2007b; Hoitash et al. 2009). These researchers assume that certain characteristics relate to 
the internal control effectiveness. Ge and McVay (2005) focus on a sample of 261 firms
that disclosed at lease one material weakness in internal controls in response to Section 
302 during the period from August 2002 to November 2004. The authors find that 
weaknesses in internal controls are related to an insufficient commitment of resources for 
accounting controls, and that disclosing material weaknesses is positively associated with 
a firm’s business complexity and is negatively associated with firm size and profitability. 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) find that firms disclosing internal control deficiencies after 
Section 302 and before Section 404 typically exhibit more complex operations, recent 
organizational changes, greater accounting risk, more auditor resignations, and fewer 
resources available for internal controls. By distinguishing the internal control problems 
between entity-wide and account-specific, Doyle et al. (2007b) document that smaller, 
younger, and financially weaker firms tend to have more entity-wide control problems, 
while complex, diversified, and rapidly changing operations firms have more account-
specific problems. Hoitash et al. (2009) conclude that board and audit committee 
characteristics also determine internal control quality. More specifically, firms with more 
audit committee members having accounting and supervisory experience, as well as 
board strength are less likely to disclose internal control weaknesses under Section 404. 
In addition, firms whose financial experts have no accounting experience or that have 
multiple financial experts are more likely to disclose internal control problems.
A more important research stream investigates the economic consequences of 
internal control weaknesses. The existing empirical evidence supports the view that 
ineffective internal controls negatively affect accruals quality (Doyle et al. 2007a; 
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Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008); analyst forecast behavior (Kim et al. 2009); cost of equity 
(Ogneva et al. 2007; Beneish et al. 2008; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009); cost of private 
debt (Costello and Witternberg-Moerman 2011; Kim et al. 2011), management forecast 
(Feng et al, 2009), and stock return (Beneish et al. 2008; Hammersley et al. 2008).
More specifically, Doyle et al. (2007a) examine the relation between accruals
quality and internal control weakness disclosures using a sample of 705 firms that 
disclosed at least one material weakness during the period from August 2002 to 
November 2005. The authors find that firms with material weaknesses are generally 
associated with lower accruals quality as measured by the extent to which accruals are 
realized as cash flows. In addition, they decompose the weaknesses into firm-level and 
account-level, and find that the relation between accruals quality and internal control 
weakness disclosures is driven by firm-level control weaknesses only. The justification is 
that firm-level controls are difficult to “audit around”. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008) 
investigate both the effect of internal control deficiencies and their remediation on 
accruals quality. The authors document that firms reporting internal control deficiencies 
have lower accruals quality as measured by accruals noise and absolute abnormal 
accruals. Also, they find that firms that report both internal control deficiencies as well as 
auditors’ confirmation of the remediation of such deficiencies exhibit an increase in 
accruals quality relative to firms that do not remediate their internal control problems. 
Using a sample of firms that disclosed auditor-attested evaluation of internal 
controls over financial reporting (under Section 404), Kim et al. (2009) examine the 
effect of internal control quality on analyst forecast behaviors. The authors argue that 
effective internal controls improve the quality of analysts’ forecasting decisions and 
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analysts take into account the disclosed internal control information when making 
forecast. Following are their main empirical results: (1) weak internal controls discourage 
analysts’ following; (2) internal control quality is negatively associated with analysts’
forecast errors and dispersions; (3) analysts’ forecast revisions and convergence of 
analysts’ beliefs subsequent to the release of earnings reports are higher for firms with 
weak internal controls. 
Ogneva et al. (2007) examine the association between cost of equity and internal 
control effectiveness for firms that file first-time Section 404 reports. The authors find 
that internal control weakness firms have higher cost of equity relative to firms that 
disclosed no internal control weaknesses. However, these differences disappear after 
controlling for fundamental firm characteristics and analyst forecast bias. Overall, the 
authors conclude that internal control weaknesses are not directly associated with high 
cost of equity. In contrast, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009) use unaudited pre-Section 404 
disclosures and Section 404 audit opinions, to assess how changes in internal control 
quality affect cost of equity. The cross-sectional analysis indicates that firms with internal 
control problems have significantly higher idiosyncratic risk, systematic risk, and cost of 
equity. In addition, the inter-temporal change analysis suggests that auditor-confirmed 
changes in internal control effectiveness are followed by significant changes in the cost of 
equity, ranging from 50 to 150 basis points. 
Using 788 firms that file internal control weakness disclosures under Section 302, 
Costello and Witternberg-Moerman (2011) examine how internal control weaknesses 
affect bank loan contracting terms. Basically, the authors argue that weakness in internal 
controls is an indicator of poor financial reporting quality. Thus lenders face more 
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information asymmetry because of the increased borrower uncertainty. Overall, they find 
that: (1) after internal control weakness disclosures, lenders decrease their reliance on 
financial covenants and financial-ratio-based performance pricing provisions; and lenders 
are more likely to require borrowers to provide additional collateral. (2) material internal 
control weaknesses lead to increase of interest rates.
Focusing on firms that filed Section 404 disclosures first-time, Kim et al. (2011) 
investigate whether various features of bank loan contracts differ between firms with 
internal control weakness problems and these without the problems. The authors argue 
that internal control problems increase pre-contract uncertainty about the credibility of 
the financial statements, which result in an increase of information asymmetries between 
borrowers and lenders. In addition, poor reporting quality increases post-contract costs 
associated with monitoring and negotiation. The empirical results are as follows: (1) loan 
spread is about 37 basis points higher for firms with internal control weakness problems; 
(2) firm-level internal control problems lead to higher loan rates relative to account-level 
problems; (3) firms with internal control problems have tighter non-pricing terms; (4) 
firms with internal control problems attract fewer lenders; and (5) lenders penalize firms
that failed to remediate previously disclosed internal control problems through charging 
higher loan rates, requiring collaterals, and structuring loans with fewer participants in 
syndicate loan. 
Feng et al. (2009) first investigate the effect of internal control quality on the 
accuracy of management guidance. With 2994 firm-year observations during 2004-2006 
with internal control disclosures under Section 404, the authors find that management 
guidance is less accurate among firms with ineffective internal controls over financial 
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reporting. In addition, this effect is larger when the ineffectiveness relates to revenues or
cost of goods sold. These findings are consistent with Feng et al. (2009) argument that 
ineffective internal controls result in inaccurate internal management report, and thus 
generating biased management forecast. 
Beneish et al. (2008) examine whether equity markets would respond to SOX 
internal control weakness disclosures. Using a sample of 330 firms making disclosures 
under the requirement of Section 302, and 383 firms making auditor-attested disclosures 
as required by Section 404, the authors find that Section 302 disclosures lead to negative 
announcement abnormal returns. However, stock market’s responses to Section 404 
disclosures are not significant. In addition, they document that auditor quality dampens 
the negative effect of Section 302 disclosures on market reactions. Focusing only on the 
disclosures under Section 302, Hammersley et al. (2008) investigate whether the equity 
market reacts to Section 302 disclosures and whether the market reacts differently to the 
various characteristics of the disclosures. The authors document following empirical 
results: (1) firm values are revised downward in the 3-day window around the Section 
302 disclosures; (2) market returns are more negative for material weakness disclosures; 
and (3) market returns are more negative for internal control weaknesses that are less 
auditable.
2.3 Corporate Bonds
2.3.1 Institutional Background of Corporate Bond Markets
In the past two decades, debt financing has represented the predominant source of 
external funds for U.S. corporations (Denis and Mihov 2003). Statistical evidence 
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indicates that the total value of U.S. corporate debt issuance during 1985-2008 amounts 
to about $23 trillion, while the total value of equity issuance for the same period 
represents only about $3 trillion.16 In corporate debt markets, bonds represent the major 
source of external financing for U.S. corporations. According to the statistics provided by 
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, the total value of U.S. corporate 
bond issuance during 1985-2008 amounts to $11 trillion. It accounts for 48.6 percent of 
U.S. corporate debt issuance during the same period.
Corporate bond is a debt security issued by a corporation. The face value of a 
typical corporate bond is $1000. Normally, the bond issuer owes bondholders a debt and 
the bondholders receive principal and interest at predetermined dates in the future. When 
a corporation decides to issue bond, it prepares a bond indenture (contract) that specifies 
the maturity date, interest rate, payment date, and covenants.17 In addition, corporations 
can offer different features with respect to early bond retirement. Redeemable (callable) 
bond can be called for early retirement at the option of the issuer. Putable bond can be 
required for early retirement at the option of bondholder. In addition, convertible bond 
can be converted to other securities of the issuer at the option of the bondholder.
The finance literature identifies various risks associated with investing in
corporate bonds. The most widely discussed include: credit risk, liquidity risk, interest 
rate risk, call and prepayment risk, yield curve risk, reinvestment risk, volatility risk, 
exchange-rate risk, and inflation risk. For the purpose of this dissertation, credit risk is 
briefly discussed. Credit risk is the risk of potential losses due to an unexpected change in 
the issuer’s credit quality. Basically, there are two types of credit risk: default risk and 
                                                
16 Date source: Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (http://www.sifma.org).
17 Covenant is designed to protect bondholders. For example, limit dividend payment, new debt issuance, 
and risky investment.
29
downgrade risk. Default risk is the risk that the issuer fails to fulfill its promised 
obligations with regard to the timely payment of interest and principal. Downgrade risk is 
the risk that the bond price will decrease due to a negative change in a bond’s credit 
rating. Bonds of corporations with low credit risk carry an investment grade rating. In 
contrast, bonds of corporations with high credit risk receive a speculative grade rating.18
In the U.S., there exist an exchange and an over-the-counter dealer market for 
corporate bond transactions.19 According to Hong and Warga (2000), less than 10 percent 
of corporate bond trading occurs on the exchange market and the majority of trading is 
carried out in the over-the-counter dealer market. The exchange and dealer markets offer 
substantially different trading environments to bondholders. The exchange market is a 
transparent electronic market with order limitation, while the over-the-counter dealer 
market lacks transparency (Hong and Warga 2000). 
2.3.2 Corporate Bond versus Bank Loan Financing 
This dissertation investigates the effect of financial reporting quality on corporate
bond financing patterns. The existing literature largely focuses on the effect of financial 
reporting quality on private bank loan contracting (Ball et al. 2008a; Graham et al. 2008; 
Wittenberg-Moerman 2008; Zhang 2008; Sunder et al. 2009; Costello and Wittenberg-
Moerman 2011; Kim et al. 2011). Ball et al. (2008a) document that the debt-contracting 
value of accounting information affects the structure of loan syndicates. Graham et al. 
(2008) examine the negative effect of financial restatements on bank loan contracting. 
                                                
18 Bonds with the ratings of BBB and above are called investment grade bonds, and with the ratings below 
BBB are called speculative grade bonds.
19 According to Hong and Warga (2000), most of the exchange trading occurs on the NYSE’s Automated 
Bond System (ABS).
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Wittenberg-Moerman (2008) finds that timely loss recognition reduces the bid-ask spread 
in private debt secondary trading. Zhang (2008) find that more conservative borrowers 
can issue loans at lower interest rates and are more likely to violate debt covenants. 
Sunder et al. (2009) document that higher level of realized conservatism results in lower 
interest spread, lower reliance on covenants, and higher slack for the net worth covenant. 
This impact is only significant when current realized conservatism is not a constraint for 
future conservatism. Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011) and Kim et al. (2011) 
provide empirical evidence that internal control weaknesses negatively affect bank loan 
contracting. Overall, these studies conclude that financial reporting quality explains the 
variation of the cost of private bank loan financing. 
What is the new insight this dissertation will offer by focusing on public bond 
financing? Public and private debt financings differ substantially in terms of monitoring 
efficiency (Diamond 1984, 1991; Rajan 1992), private information availability (Fama 
1985; Bhattacharya and Chiesa 1995), seniority in liquidation (Carey 1995; Welch 1997), 
and renegotiation flexibility (Bharath et al. 2008). Diamond (1984) indicates that a bank,
as a financial intermediary, would solve the information duplication and free-rider 
problems when monitoring a borrower. Diamond (1991) predicts that direct public 
borrowing implies a less efficient monitoring of a borrower’s behavior than private 
borrowing. Private lenders devote more effort in direct monitoring, thus alleviating the
moral hazard problem in a more efficient way. In addition, Rajan (1992) argue that 
concentrated bank debt lenders have more incentives to monitor the borrowers compared 
to the dispersed “arm’s length” debt holders. Fama (1985) argues that private debt lenders 
are more efficient and effective in obtaining private information about borrowers than are 
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public bondholders. Thus private debt financing mitigates the information asymmetry 
between borrowers and lenders. Similarly, Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995) introduce an 
analytical model to support the view that borrowers would share proprietary information 
with a concentrated group of private lenders but not with diffused public lenders. Welch 
(1997) argues that private bank lenders are better negotiators, lobbyists, and litigants than 
public bondholders are. Borrowers have incentives to give the private lenders senior 
creditor status in order to avoid confrontations with them in times of financial distress. In 
that regard, Carey (1995) points out that 99% of bank loan contracts recorded in the Loan 
Pricing Corporation Dealscan database contain senior priority clauses. I argue that, due to 
these monitoring, information, and liquidation disadvantages, public bondholders would
require higher financial reporting quality than private lenders to protect their investments. 
Bharath et al. (2008) find that accounting quality affects both the price and non-price 
terms of the private bank loan issues. However, due to re-contracting inflexibility for 
public debt, accounting quality only affects the price terms of the dispersed public bond 
issues. Accounting conservatism and internal controls play very important roles to 
mitigate the previously discussed disadvantages facing by public bondholders. 
However, the existing literature provides limited empirical evidence with regard 
to the effect of financial reporting quality on public bond financing. Some studies use 
inferred or indirect measure of financial reporting quality (audit quality and analyst 
forecast) to explain the cost of public bond financing (Mansi et al. 2004, 2011). Mansi et 
al. (2004) examine the relationship between analyst forecast characteristics and the yield 
spread of new corporate bond issues. The authors find that issuers with informative 
analyst activity can issue bonds at lower yield spreads, and this impact of analyst activity 
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is increased with the uncertainty about issuer value. Mansi et al. (2011) investigate 
whether auditor characteristics influence the yield spread of new corporate bond issues. 
They document that issuers with a higher quality auditor and with a longer relationship 
with their auditor can issue bonds at lower yield spread. In addition, this impact is more 
pronounced if a bond is categorized as non-investment grade. Overall, these studies 
indicate that auditor characteristics and analyst activity are valued in corporate bond 
markets. Some studies use accrual quality as proxy for financial reporting quality to 
explain the cost of public bond financing (Bharath 2008). But accrual quality do not 
directly relate to the debt contracting context. This study uses a financial reporting 
attribute (conservatism) that is closely related to debt financing context to explain the cost 
of public bond financing. Nikolaev (2010) documents the relation between conditional 
conservatism and non-price terms of corporate bond financing. However, as suggested by 
Bharath et al. (2008) accounting quality only affect the price terms of public debt 
financing. So, it is interesting to investigate the relation between conservatism and price 
terms of public debt financing.
Compared to the literature on private debt financing, and considering the 
economic significance of public debt financing for U.S. corporations, the literature on 
public debt markets is relatively underdeveloped. One possible explanation is that private 
bank loan contracts include various pricing and non-pricing terms, and offer bank loan 
lenders various monitoring and negotiation channels, which involve more theoretical 
arguments and research potentials. Thus relatively more studies related to the debt 
financing focus on private bank loan markets. Another reason is that the over-the-counter 
dealer market carries out the majority of bond trading and there is limited publicly 
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available trading information (Hong and Warga 2000). In January 2001, the SEC 
approved rules that require the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)
members to report all secondary market transactions in corporate bonds. NASD
implemented the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) in July 2002.20
TRACE alleviates the corporate bond trading data limitation problem faced by prior 
studies. Thus, it enlarges research avenues by providing researchers with opportunities to 
conduct event studies relate to corporate bond markets. This dissertation complements the
public bond financing literature by using financial reporting quality to explain the yield 
spread of new corporate bond issues and the underpricing of newly issued corporate 
bonds.
2.4 Synthesis
There is no formal agreed-upon definition for accounting conservatism even 
though it has existed for more than six hundred years. Among the four basic demands for 
conservatism (contracting, litigation, taxation and regulation), contracting demand is 
widely recognized as the incipient and dominant demand. Contracting demand stems
from agency theory that principals can use accounting conservatism to offset the potential 
opportunistic behaviors of agents. The literature mainly documents two types of 
conservatism: conditional and unconditional conservatism. According to traditional debt 
contracting efficiency view, only conditional conservatism signals new information to 
creditors and thus enhances contracting efficiency, since timely loss recognition reflects 
the shocks of contemporaneous economic events. In contrast, unconditional conservatism 
                                                
20 At that time, only investment grade bonds with initial issuance amount over $1 billion are required to 
disseminate. Start from October 1, 2004, TRACE requires the dissemination of the transaction for all 
bonds.
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cannot increase contracting efficiency because it is only a downward accounting bias 
without adjusting the effect of contemporaneous economic events.
Internal control over financial reporting has been a concern for policymakers far 
before SOX. Prior attempts to internal control disclosure provide a framework for SOX
internal control provisions. Even with the advocated benefits of lowering the cost of 
capital and restoring investors’ confidence, internal control provisions are regarded as the 
most controversial SOX provisions. The main controversy is the high compliance cost. 
Academics argue that internal control weaknesses increase the uncertainty about the 
credibility and reliability of financial statements, which further increase the information 
asymmetries between management and other outside parties (investors, analysts, and 
lenders). Thus, SOX internal control disclosures are deemed to be informative and 
beneficial. In addition, empirical evidence indicates that outside parties would negatively 
react to ineffective internal controls and require higher risk premiums as compensations. 
Public and private debt financings differ substantially in terms of monitoring 
efficiency, private information availability, seniority in liquidation, and renegotiation 
flexibility. With these disadvantages, public bondholders may require conservative 
reporting and effective internal controls to protect their investments. In addition, 
comparing to the literature on private debt financing and considering the economic 
significance of public debt financing for U.S. corporations, the literature on public debt
markets is relatively underdeveloped. This dissertation complements the bond financing 
literature by using financial reporting quality to explain the yield spread of new corporate
bond issues and the underpricing of newly issued corporate bonds.
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Chapter 3 The Effect of Accounting Conservatism and Internal Control 
Effectiveness on the yield spread of New Corporate Bond Issues
3.1 Hypothesis Development
3.1.1 Conditional Conservatism and Yield Spread
Among the four widely recognized explanations for accounting conservatism 
(contracting, litigation, regulation, and taxation, as per Watts 2003a, 2003b), contracting, 
especially debt contracting, is the most influential and intensively studied one.
Conditional conservatism depends on future economic circumstances. Beaver and Ryan 
(2005, p.269) define conditional conservatism as “book values are written down under 
sufficiently adverse circumstances but not written up under favorable circumstances.” 
This definition is consistent with Basu’s (1997) notion of conservatism—timely loss 
recognition. Agency cost and debt contracting efficiency arguments are the two major 
explanations for conditional conservatism in the debt context. Due to information 
asymmetry between agents and principals, and the limited liability and tenure of agents, 
agents (e.g. managers of the firm) have strong incentives to engage in opportunistic 
behaviors to maximize their own benefits at the expense of other contracting parties (e.g.,
creditors). Conditional conservatism mitigates information asymmetries among 
contracting parties, and thus alleviates adverse selection and moral hazard problems, as 
indicated by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Contracting theory predicts that conditional 
conservatism and unconditional conservatism play substantially different roles in 
enhancing contracting efficiency. According to Ball and Shivakumar (2005), only 
conditional conservatism signals new information to creditors and thus enhances 
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contracting efficiency. Timely loss recognition improves ex post monitoring and 
increases the likelihood of a debt covenant violation. In the case of a covenant violation, 
the decision rights will transfer from equity holders to debt holders. Thus, conditional 
conservative reporting serves as a platform for efficient contracting (Watts 2003a), 
especially when managers have strong incentives to overstate accounting numbers 
through their discretionary choices. 
Existing studies largely focus on private bank loan markets when testing these 
agency cost and debt contracting efficiency arguments (Wittenberg-Moerman 2008; 
Zhang 2008). Wittenbery-Moerman (2008) documents that conditional conservative 
reporting reduces the bid-ask spread in the secondary loan trade. Using four conditional 
conservatism measures, Zhang (2008) finds that the spread of the initial loan interest rate 
over the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) is negatively related to borrowers’ 
conservatism. Focusing on non-price terms of public debt contracts, Nikolaev (2010) 
documents that reliance on covenants promotes conditional conservative reporting. 
Different from Nikolaev (2010), my study focuses on price terms of public debt contracts,
because Bharath et al. (2008) find that accounting quality affects both the price and non-
price terms of private bank loan issues. However, they also document that, due to re-
contracting inflexibility for public debt, accounting quality only affects the price terms of 
the dispersed public bond issues. Consistent with agency theory and debt contracting 
efficiency view of conditional conservatism, and with prior empirical evidence in private 
bank loan context, I make the following prediction:
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, a firm’s conditional conservative reporting 
relates to a lower yield spread for new corporate bonds. 
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However, public debt markets may not value conditional conservative reporting. 
As discussed in Section 2.3.2, public and private debt financings differ substantially in 
terms of monitoring efficiency (Diamond 1984, 1991; Rajan 1992), private information 
availability (Fama 1985; Bhattacharya and Chiesa 1995), seniority in liquidation (Carey 
1995; Welch 1997), and renegotiation flexibility (Bharath et al. 2008). I argue that due to 
these monitoring, information, liquidation, and renegotiation disadvantages over private 
debt holders, public bondholders are more likely to resort to price terms rather than non-
price terms to mitigate information asymmetries between management and 
bondholders. 21 This argument is corroborated by Bharath et al. (2008) findings that 
accounting quality only affects the price terms of the dispersed public bond issues. 
Similarly, Basu, Weintrop and Wu (2010) argue that the different monitoring functions 
and covenant features between private and public debt contracting result in different 
enforceability of conditional conservative reporting. Their empirical evidence indicates 
that bondholders fail to enforce conditional conservative reporting after seasoned bond 
offerings. Since public bondholders focus less on non-price terms (e.g., monitoring and 
covenant), and have weak ex post enforceability of conditional conservatism, I further 
argue that public bondholders will not value conditional conservatism as an efficient 
contracting mechanism.
In addition, the literature documents some potential negative effect of conditional 
conservative reporting. Kothari, Ramanna, and Skinner (2010) point out that management 
can abuse the timely loss recognition standards to generate “cookie-jar” reserves. 
                                                
21 The commonly used non-price terms in private bank loan contracting are “covenant” and “collateral” 
(Costello and Witternberg-Moerman 2009).
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According to the prior literature, management can use conditional conservatism as an 
income-smoothing device and management has incentive to be overly conservative 
following management turnovers to allow enough space for future profitability (e.g., 
Murphy and Zimmerman 1993; DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner 1994; Francis, Hanna 
and Vincent 1996). With less private information channels, public bondholders are less 
likely to identify the true reasons for borrowers’ conditional conservative reporting. In 
debt contracting setting, Gigler, Kanodia, Sapra and Venugopalan (2009) develop the 
statistical properties of various degrees of conservatism and their analytical model 
suggests that conditional conservatism decreases the efficiency of debt contracts. They 
argue that accounting conservatism results in less informative financial reporting. More 
specifically, Gigler et al. (2009) indicate that timely loss recognition with lax verifiability 
standards results in lower information content since such reporting conveys less 
information about the actual probability of the loss occurring.22 In addition, the finance 
literature documents that the financial covenants in public debt are set looser, while the 
covenants in private debt are set tighter (Dichev and Skinner 2002; Begley and Freedman 
2004).23 As a result, conditional conservative reporting can accelerate covenant violations
for private debt relative to public debt. 24 In case of a violation, it is costly for 
management to involve the private lender review and to negotiate for new covenant terms 
                                                
22 Both a future loss with 90% occurrence probability and a loss with 10% occurrence probability may be 
recognized as a loss under conditional conservative reporting. The difference in the probabilities of the 
losses makes conditional conservative reporting less informative.
23 According to Milken Institute 2004, quarterly covenant compliance reports are required in some private 
debt contracts. Also, Dichev and Skinner (2002) indicate that private lenders would set financial constraints 
close to the actual current value, which increases the likelihood of covenant violation.
24 Being well protected by tight covenants, public debt holders may require lower yield spread for new debt 
issues.
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(Dichev and Skinner 2002).25 In addition, the renegotiation of the debt contract may 
result in favorable contracting terms (e.g., increase interest rate and impose additional 
constraints) from lenders’ perspective, which has a negative impact on borrowers’ future 
cash flows and operating flexibility (Dichev and Skinner 2002). Hence, bondholders will 
negatively value conditional conservatism that could accelerate private debt covenant 
violations.
To sum up, traditional debt contracting efficiency argument and agency theory 
predict that debt holders could value conditional conservatism positively. However, 
public bondholders’ information disadvantages restrict their monitoring role and their 
weak ex post enforceability mitigate their ex ante demand for conditional conservatism.
In addition, management can abuse the timely loss recognition standard, and conditional 
conservatism can lower the information content of public reports. Furthermore, 
conditional conservative reporting could accelerate the costly private debt covenant 
violation. 
3.1.2 Unconditional Conservatism and Yield Spread
The consistent application of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles that 
reduce earnings independent of future economic events results in unconditional 
conservatism. Accounting to the definition of unconditional conservatism by Beaver and 
Ryan (2005, p.269), “the book value of net assets is understated due to predetermined 
aspects of the accounting process.” This definition is keeping with Beaver and Ryan 
(2000) notion of conservatism—biased underestimation of book value. Contracting 
                                                
25 In the case of a covenant violation, borrowers need to prepare updated and detailed financial reports to 
the lenders, and management spends time to explain and justify the financial situation of the issuer with 
lenders.   
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theory predicts that unconditional conservatism cannot increase contracting efficiency 
because it seems “inefficient or at best neutral in contracting” (Ball and Shivakumar 
2005, p.91). Thus, contracting parties can adjust for unconditional conservatism ex ante. 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) suggest that contract terms can be written to reverse the 
effect of accounting methods that result in unconditional conservatism.26 Basu (2005) 
uses historical evidence to suggest that unconditional conservatism is used mainly for 
regulatory or tax purposes, such as the expensing of R&D expenditures as required by 
SFAS and the acceleration of amortization for tax incentives. Qiang (2007) investigates 
whether the previously mentioned four demands for accounting conservatism apply to 
conditional and unconditional conservatism respectively. She finds that contracting 
demand induces only conditional conservatism, while regulation and taxation demands 
induce only unconditional conservatism. Litigation consideration induces both 
conditional and unconditional conservatism 
However, a recent stream of argument suggests that unconditional 
conservatism enhances debt contracting efficiency by the commitment to 
underestimate the book value. Chan, Lin and Strong (2009) argue that 
unconditional conservative reporting increases the persistence and predictability of 
current and future earnings and thus signals good quality earnings to the market. 
The debt contracting efficiency view indicates that contracting parties can undo the effect 
of unconditional conservatism by adjusting contracting terms (Ball and Shivakumar 
2005). For private bank loan contracting, issuers and private banks can adjust the effect 
                                                
26 For example, if book values of assets are consistently understated by a known amount, then in a debt 
covenant, an agent may need to increase the book values by this amount when determining the total amount 
the firm can borrow without affecting pricing terms (Ball and Shivakumar 2005).
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of unconditional conservatism through either pricing terms (e.g., interest rate) or non-
pricing terms (e.g., monitoring and covenant). What about public bond contracting? 
Recalling the argument in Section 3.1.1 that the monitoring, information, liquidation, and 
renegotiation disadvantages over private debt holders make public bondholders more 
likely to resort to price terms rather than non-price terms to mitigate the information 
problem (Bharath et al. 2008), I argue that public bondholders are more likely to resort to 
pricing terms to adjust the effect of unconditional conservatism ex ante. Since 
unconditional conservative reporting immunizes the bond issuers from future potential 
default by underestimating the “true” value of assets and increasing the “quality” of 
assets (Qiang 2007), I argue that unconditional conservatism decreases the perceived 
default risk of bond issuers and bondholders will positively respond to it through lower 
risk premium. 
Empirical studies support the above argument of the effect of unconditional 
conservatism on both equity and debt settings (Ahmed et al. 2002; Chan et al. 2009). 
Ahmed et al. (2002) do not provide differential arguments for the effect of conditional 
and unconditional conservatism on cost of debt. Instead they make the predictions for 
conservatism as a whole. However, one of their proxies for conservatism, the Beaver and 
Ryan (2000) market-based measure, captures unconditional conservatism. Ahmed et al. 
(2002) find that unconditional conservative reporting results in a lower cost of debt. Chan 
et al. (2009) find that unconditional conservative reporting results in lower cost of equity.
Different from Ahmed et al. (2002), my study provides differential arguments for the 
effects of conditional conservatism and unconditional conservatism on the cost of public 
bond. Instead of using an indirect proxy for the cost of debt, credit ratings, as did Ahmed 
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et al. (2002), I use a direct measure, yield spread, to test the effect of unconditional 
conservatism on the cost of new corporate bond issues. In addition, by exclusively 
focusing on the public bond market, this study includes some bond-level variables as 
further controls. In light of the above discussed conceptual argument and recent empirical 
evidence, I predict that bond market participants will positively respond to unconditional
conservatism reporting through risk premiums.
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, a firm’s unconditional conservative 
reporting relates to a lower yield spread for new corporate bonds. 
3.1.3 Internal Controls and Yield Spread
Following several financial reporting scandals, the United States enacted the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in July 2002. The purpose of SOX is to improve the quality 
of corporate financial disclosures and to restore the confidence of public investors (SOX 
2002). Among its various aspects, SOX internal control provisions (Section 302 and 
Section 404) attracted much attention, leading to the emergence of two main research 
streams. One stream of research investigates the economic factors that determine internal 
control weaknesses (Ge and McVay 2005; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle 2007b; 
Hoitash et al. 2009), while another stream investigates the economic consequences of 
internal control weaknesses. Empirical evidence supports the view that internal control 
weaknesses negatively affect accruals quality (Doyle et al. 2007a; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
2008); analyst forecast behavior (Kim et al. 2009); cost of equity (Ogneva et al. 2007; 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009); cost of debt (Costello and Witternberg-Moerman 2011; 
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Kim et al. 2011), management forecast (Feng et al., 2009), and stock returns (Beneish et 
al. 2008).
Policymakers and regulators advocate that internal control provisions can 
eventually generate high-quality financial reporting, which will lower the cost of capital 
(U.S. House of Representatives 2005). However, the existing internal control literature 
focuses exclusively on private bank loan contracting to study the impact of internal 
control weaknesses on the cost of debt. Using 788 firms that file internal control 
weakness disclosures under Section 302, Costello and Witternberg-Moerman (2011) 
examine how internal control weaknesses affect bank loan contracting terms. Overall, 
they find that: (1) after internal control weakness disclosures, lenders decrease their 
reliance on financial covenants and financial-ratio-based performance pricing provisions, 
and lenders are more likely to require borrowers to provide additional collateral; (2) 
material internal control weaknesses lead to increase of interest rates. Focusing on firms 
that file Section 404 disclosures for the first time, Kim et al. (2011) investigate whether 
various features of bank loan contracts differ between firms with internal control 
weakness problems and those without the problems. The empirical results are as follows: 
(1) Loan spread is about 37 basis points higher for firms with internal control weakness 
problems; (2) Firm-level internal control problems lead to higher loan rates relative to 
account-level problems; (3) Firms with internal control problems have tighter non-pricing 
terms; (4) Firms with internal control problems attract fewer lenders; and (5) Lenders 
penalize firms that failed to remediate previously disclosed internal control problems by 
charging higher loan rates, requiring collaterals, and structuring loans with fewer 
participants in syndicate loan. 
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According to Merton’s (1974) theoretical bond pricing model, bond value is 
positively associated with the firm’s market value (mean effect) and negatively associated 
with the volatility of the firm’s operations (variance effect). I argue that effective internal 
controls affect bond value through both the mean effect and the variance effect. For the 
mean effect, effective internal controls restrict managers’ propensity to make risky 
investments and to engage in fraudulent activities, thus preventing unintended wealth 
transfers and managers’ opportunistic behaviors. 27 Consequently, effective internal 
controls increase a firm’s expected future cash flows and thus, the value of the firm 
(Fernandez 2004). For the variance effect, effective internal controls increase the 
perceived quality of accounting information and decrease the perceived information risk. 
And thus ultimately decrease the perceived volatility of the firm’s operations. This 
reasoning is similar to the argument by Kim et al. (2011) that weaknesses in internal 
controls increase pre-contract uncertainty about the creditworthiness of borrowers and 
information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders. 
Goh and Li (2011) examine the relation between internal control weaknesses and 
conditional conservatism. They find that (1) firms with maternal weaknesses in internal 
controls have lower conditional conservative reporting than firms without such 
weaknesses; and (2) firms that with such weaknesses and subsequently remediate the 
weaknesses have higher conditional conservative reporting than firms that continue to 
have material weaknesses. They argue that effective internal controls could create an 
incentive for conservative reporting and reduce unintentional errors in accrual estimations. 
Consistent with Goh and Li (2011) argument that effective internal controls enhance
                                                
27 For example, wealth transfers from bondholders to shareholders through excessive dividends or from 
bondholders to management through excessive compensation.
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creditability to conservative reporting, this thesis investigates the moderating effect of 
internal controls on the relation between conservatism and yield spread of new corporate 
bond issues. Extending the argument for Hypothesis 1 and 2, I predict the following 
moderating effect of internal control effectiveness: 
Hypothesis 3a: Ceteris paribus, a firm’s conditional conservative 
reporting is less effective in lowering the yield spread for new corporate 
bonds for issuers with ineffective internal controls.
Hypothesis 3b: Ceteris paribus, a firm’s unconditional conservative 
reporting is less effective in lowering the yield spread for new corporate 
bonds for issuers with ineffective internal controls.
3.2 Research Design
3.2.1 Sample Selection
This study focuses on the yield spread of new corporate bond issues and the 
sample for this study comes from the following databases: (1) the Mergent Fixed Income 
Securities Database (Mergent FISD) for bond-specific information; (2) the Audit 
Analytics for internal control effectiveness information; (3) the COMPUSTAT for bond 
issuers’ financial information; (4) the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) for 
bond issuers’ equity returns information. 
To test Hypothesis 1, I collect data from Mergent FISD, COMPUSTAT, and 
CRSP. After merging the samples from the three databases, controlling for outliers, and 
eliminating the observations with missing variables, I obtain 2569 observations (distinct 
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new bond issues) from 796 firms during the 1991-2009 period.28 To test Hypothesis 2, I
also collect data from Mergent FISD, COMPUSTAT, and CRSP. After merging the 
samples from the three databases, controlling for outliers, and eliminating the 
observations with missing variables, I obtain 2396 observations (distinct new bond issues) 
from 511 firms for further analysis during the 1991-2009 period.29 To test Hypothesis 3a 
and 3b, I collect data from Mergent FISD, Audit Analytics, COMPUSTAT, and CRSP. 
After merging the samples from the four databases and eliminating the observations with 
missing variable, I obtain 421 and 357 observations (distinct new bond issues) during the 
2005-2009 sample period to test Hypothesis 3a and 3b respectively.30 To control for the 
effect of outliers, I winsorize all the continuous variables in the three samples at the top 
and bottom one percent. I eliminate variable coupon and zero coupon bonds, as well as 
perpetual bonds31. Bonds issued by public financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) are 
excluded. Since financial firms operating under different regulations, they have different 
debt financing activities than industrial firms (Khurana and Raman 2003; Jiang 2008). 
3.2.2 Empirical Model
Based on prior research (Ziebart and Reiter 1992; Sengupta 1998; Khurana and 
Raman 2003; Shi 2003; Jiang 2008), I use the following empirical models to test the 
                                                
28 Following Khan and Watts (2009), I delete firm years with negative total assets or book values of equity, 
and delete firm years with price per share below $1. In addition, I control outliers by eliminating firms in 
the top and bottom one percent with regard to earnings, returns, size, market-to-book ratio, and leverage. 
29 Following Beaver and Ryan (2000), I control the effect of outliers by winsorizing book-to-market ratio at 
0 and 4.  
30 Small sample size is common for studies pertaining to bond markets (Dhillon and Johnson 1994; Shi 
2003). One possible explanation is that a large portion of bond issuers are non-public firms and that there is 
no equity return information available for these non-public bond issuers. 
31 According to Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell and Xu (2009), these bonds tend to be unique and to 
behave more like equities. 
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effect of conservative reporting and internal control effectiveness on the yield spread of 
new corporate bond issues:
YieldSpreadijt !"#1 + $1Conit + $2IssuerSizeit + $3ROAit + $4Leverageit + 
$5Maturityijt + $6IssueSizeijt + $7Ratingijt + $8BusiCycleijt + $9RedeemDijt
+ $10PutDijt + $11ConvertDijt + $12415RegDijt + $13144aRegDijt + Industry 
& %&'(")*++,&-"."/ijt                                                                             (1)  
YieldSpreadijt !" #1 ." $1Conit + $2SOX404Dijt + $3Con*SOX404Dijt
.$4IssuerSizeit ."$5ROAit ."$6Leverageit ."$7Maturityijt ."$8IssueSizeijt + 
$9Ratingijt ."$10BusiCycleijt ."$11RedeemDijt ."$12PutDijt ."$13ConvertDijt
."$14415RegDijt ."$15144aRegDijt + Industry & %&'(")*++,&-"."/ijt     (2)  
According to Petersen (2009), the standard errors calculated by an OLS regression 
for panel data could be biased due to the within-firm overtime, or across-firm residual 
correlation. Thus, I correct the standard errors of the OLS regression for firm-level 
clustering as well as for heteroscedasticity.
Dependent Variable
YieldSpread: Following previous studies, I measure yield spread as the difference 
between the corporate bond yield at issuance and the Treasury bond yield with 
comparable maturity (Shi 2003; Jiang 2008; Wang and Zhang 2009). The subscript ijt
means bond j for firm i in year t. Yield spread captures the risk premium that bond issuers 
pay to bond investors in order to raise funds from the corporate bond market. Treasury 
bonds are issued by national governments. Because government bonds are backed by the 
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high credit quality and taxing power of a country, they have very little credit risk. Thus, 
yield spread is a direct and accurate measure of issuers’ incremental cost of bond over a 
comparable risk-free Treasury bond. In fact, by subtracting corporate bond yield from a 
comparable Treasury bond yield, I control for the effect of economy-wide information.
Tested Variable
I employ two proxies for conservative reporting (Con). 1) ConCon: firm-year 
conditional conservatism measure introduced by Khan and Watts (2009). 2) UnCon: 
firm-year unconditional conservatism measure introduced by Beaver and Ryan (2000). 
SOX404D: a dummy variable for internal control effectiveness. This variable is 1 if a new 
bond issue is offered after the conclusion by an auditor under SOX Section 404 that the 
issuer’s internal control over financial reporting are not effective, and 0 if the new bond 
issue is offered after the conclusion by an auditor that the issuer’s internal control over 
financial reporting are effective.32
Firm-level Control Variable
IssuerSize: The natural log of an issuer’s assets at the end of the fiscal year 
immediately prior to the corporate bond issuance date. Issuers with larger assets are 
perceived to be less risky (lower default risk) compared to those with smaller assets. 
Hence, it is expected to be negatively related to the risk premium. 
ROA: Return on assets of the issuer, defined as net income divided by total assets 
at the end of the fiscal year immediately prior to the corporate bond issuance date. A 
                                                
32 This categorization is consistent with Kim et al. (2011), who investigate the effect of internal control 
effectiveness on private bank loan contracts.
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higher ROA generally implies greater profitability and is thus expected to be negatively 
related to the risk premium.
Leverage: Long term debt divided by total assets of the issuer at the end of the 
fiscal year immediately prior to the corporate bond issuance date. Leverage is expected to 
be positively related to the risk premium.
Bond-level Control Variable
Rating: A dummy variable for the credit rating. It is 1 if the new bond issues are 
rated as investment grades (Baa or above) by Moody’s, and 0 for those rated as non-
investment grades (Ba or below) (Bharath et al. 2008).33 For issues without Moody’s 
rating, Standard & Poor’s rating or Fitch rating is used instead. Credit rating indicates the 
creditworthiness of the issue and thus is expected to be negatively related to the risk 
premium (Shi 2003; Jiang 2008).
Maturity: The natural log of the number of years until the bond matures. Usually, 
bond issues with longer maturity are perceived to be more risky than the issues with 
shorter maturity (Khurana and Raman 2003; Shi 2003). Thus, maturity is expected to be 
positively related to the risk premium. 
IssueSize:  The natural log of the par value of the bond initially issued in millions 
of dollars. A larger issue size can enjoy a lower risk premium due to the economies of 
scale in underwriting (Sengupta 1998). However, Khurana and Raman (2003) point out 
                                                
33 Some studies sequentially convert the credit ratings to numbers, for example with 1 for AAA through 21 
for C. However, the underlying assumption is that the average quality difference between any two adjacent 
ratings is the same as that between any other two adjacent ratings. Consistent with Khurana and Raman 
(2003), this study releases this assumption by using dichotomy categorization: investment vs. non-
investment grade. My argument is that, in new bond issue market, the difference between any two adjacent 
ratings is more value relevant if the two adjacent ratings are ranked around investment vs. non-investment 
grade cutoff when compared to those ranked around two extremes.
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that large issue size increases the difficulty for underwriters to place the issue with 
investors, and, on the basis of cross-sectional observations spanning 20 years, Wang and 
Zhang (2009) find that issue size is positively associated with bond yield spread. Thus, I 
do not make predictions for the sign of issue size. 
BusiCycle: Business cycle is the difference between the average yield of Moody’s 
Aaa bonds for the month of issue and the average yield of 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds 
for the month of issue. This variable controls for the time-series variation of risk 
premiums over the business cycle. Prior studies predict that it is positively related to the 
risk premium (Sengupta 1998; Shi 2003; Jiang 2008).
RedeemD: A dummy variable for the call feature of the bond. It is 1 for bonds that 
have a call option and 0 otherwise. A redeemable bond offers issuers the option to 
repurchase the bond before maturity. It increases the potential interest risk for 
bondholders and is expected to be positively related to the risk premium.
PutD: A dummy variable for the put feature of the bond. It is 1 for bonds with a 
put option and 0 otherwise. Putable bond offers bondholders the option to retire the bond 
before maturity and thus is expected to be negatively related to the risk premium.
ConvertD: A dummy variable for the convert feature of the bond. It is 1 for bonds 
with a convert option and 0 otherwise. Mayers (1998) suggests that lowering the interest 
rate is one consideration for firms to issue convertible bonds. It is expected to be 
negatively related to the risk premium.
415RegD: A dummy variable for the SEC Rule 415 shelf registration feature of 
the bond. It is 1 for bonds issued under a shelf registration and 0 otherwise. According to 
Rule 415, issuers are allowed to pre-register a certain amount of securities (e.g. equities 
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and bonds). In the case of bonds, issuers have the option to take bonds off the “shelf” and 
offering them to the public at a favorable time up to two years in the future. Therefore, 
the coefficient for this variable is expected to be negative.
144aRegD: A dummy variable for the SEC Rule 144a private placement feature 
of the bond. It is 1 for bonds issued through private placements that are exempt from 
registration and 0 otherwise. Rule 144a issues are generally offered to a limited number 
of institutional investors, known as Qualified Institutional Buyers. Since institutional 
investors have stronger negotiation power over public investors on the coupon rate, I 
expect the coefficient for this variable is positively related to the risk premium.
Industry and Year Dummy
In line with the prior literature, I include industry dummies and year dummies in 
the regression model to further control for the potential differences in issuer and issue 
features across industries and over time (Shi 2003; Kim et al. 2011).
3.2.3 Measurement of Variable
Conditional Conservatism
I use Khan and Watts (2009) firm-year measure of conservatism as the proxy for 
conditional conservatism. Firms with more conditional conservative reporting have a 
higher C_Score. According to Khan and Watts (2009), C_Score captures variation in 
conservatism and predicts asymmetric earnings timeliness at horizons of up to three years 
ahead. This measure follows Basu’s (1997) notion of timely loss recognition; however, it
overcomes Basu’s (1997) limitation of single-period cross-sectional regression or single-
firm time series regression as indicated by Givoly, Hayn and Natarajan (2007). Khan and 
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Watts (2009) modify the original Basu (1997) regression to allow coefficients to vary 
across firms and time as follows:
Xit !"$1t ."$2tDit ."$3itRit ."$4itDitRit ."/it                                                    (3)
Where Xit is earnings for firm i in year t, Rit is returns for firm i in year t, and Dit
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if Rit 0"1"'23"1"456&(7,-&8"$3it is a firm-year good news 
5,+&9,2&--" +&'-*(&" '23" $4it is the incremental firm-year timeliness for bad news over 
good news.    
Khan and Watts (2009) assumes that both the timeliness of good news and the 
incremental timeliness of bad news are linear functions of time-varying firm-specific 
characteristics: 
G_Score :"$3it !";1t .";2tSizeit .";3tM/Bit .";4tLevit                                (4)
C_Score :"$4it !"<1t ."<2tSizeit ."<3tM/Bit ."<4tLevit                                 (5)
Where ;i and <i, i = 1 to 4, are constant across firms but vary across time. Sizeit is 
the natural log of market value of equity for firm i in year t, M/Bit is the ratio of market 
value of equity to book value of equity for firm i in t; and Levit is leverage, defined as 
long-term debt plus short-term debt deflated by market value of equity for firm i in year t. 
G_Score is the firm-year measure of good news timeliness, while C_Score is the firm-
year measure of conservatism. G_Score and C_Score vary across firms through cross-
sectional variation in the firm-year characteristics, e.g., Size, M/B, and Lev. Equations (4) 
and (5) are substituted into regression equation (3) to yield the following equation (6):
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Xit = $1 + $2Dit + Rit (;1t + ;2t Sizeit + ;3t M/Bit + ;4t Levit) + DitRit (<1t + 
<2t Sizeit + <3tM/Bit + <4t Levit) + /it                                                                    (6)
Equation (6) is estimated using annual cross-sectional regressions. C_Score is 
then calculated using equation (5) to proxy for my measure of conditional conservatism 
(ConCon). 
Unconditional Conservatism
Beaver and Ryan (2000) argue that book-to-market ratios consist of bias 
(persistent) components and lagged (transitory) components. They suggest that lagged 
components proxy for currently unrecognized economic gains and losses and that bias 
components reflect persistent differences between book and market values. They attribute 
this difference to unconditional conservative reporting. In addition, Beaver and Ryan 
(2000) empirically measure the two components with the following equation (7):
BTMit = #0 ."#i ."#t ."$0Retit ."$1Retit-1 ."$2Retit-2 ."$3Retit-3 ."$4Retit-4 + 
$5Retit-5 ."$6Retit-6 ."/it                                                                            (7)
Where BTMit is the book-to-market ratio for firm i in year t and Retit is the equity 
return (adjustment for dividends) for firm i in year t. According to Beaver and Ryan 
(2000), #,"='>5*(&-"56&"?,(+-specific information which reflects the bias component of the 
book-to-+'(@&5" ('5,48" A,2=&" #," ,2B&(-&9C" (&9'5&-" 54" 56&" 3&D(&&" 4?" *2=423,5,42'9"





Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the observations for the conditional 
conservatism sample and the unconditional conservatism sample by year. The sample 
period for the two conservatism samples are from 1991 to 2009. In total there are 2569 
observations in the conditional conservatism sample, and 2396 observations in the 
unconditional conservatism sample. Though the conditional and unconditional 
conservatism samples are based on the same sample period, the sample sizes for these 
two samples are different. This is due to the different methods used to calculate 
conditional conservatism and unconditional conservatism measures.34
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the conservatism sample. Since 
my sample has both firm-level and bond-level variables, the number of observations used 
to calculate the descriptive statistics differ between the two types of variables. According 
to Panel A of Table 2, the average yield spread for the conditional conservatism sample is 
164.07 basis points (about 1.64 percent). The minimum and maximum yield spreads are -
345.5 and 850 basis points respectively. 35 The average degree of conditional 
conservatism is -0.0449, with a standard deviation of 0.1804. About eighty-seven percent 
                                                
34 As discussed in Section 3.2.3, to measure conditional conservatism, I only need the current year’s stock 
return; whereas to calculate unconditional conservatism, I need annual returns from the past six years. 
Thus, the number of observations in the unconditional conservatism sample is less than those in the 
conditional conservatism sample.
35 The negative yield spread could be justified by the putable or convertible feature of the new bond issues. 
Putable bonds give bondholders the option to retire the bond before maturity. It is an additional benefit to 
bondholders. Thus, issuers can sometimes issue putable bonds with offering yield that is lower than the 
compatible U.S. Treasury yield. Also, Mayers (1998) suggests that lowering the interest rate is one 
consideration for firms to issue convertible bonds.
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of bonds are issued by issuers with effective internal control over financial reporting, 
which is consistent with Kim et al.’s (2011) descriptive statistics that about 13% of 
sample firms have weak internal controls. The average ROA and leverage of the bond 
issuer are 1.99% and 26.38%. The mean credit rating is 0.2153, which means that about 
22% of new bond issues are investment grade as rated by Moody’s. Respectively, 59%, 
6%, and 18% of new bond issues have call, put, and convert options. In addition, 62% of 
new bond issues are issued under shelf registration and 30% of the new bond issues are 
issued through private placement. Panel B of Table 2 indicates that the average yield 
spread for the unconditional conservatism sample is 154.05 basis points. The minimum 
and maximum yield spreads are -410 and 747.5 basis points respectively. The average 
degree of unconditional conservatism is 0.3435, with a standard deviation of 0.3515. 
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Table 3 represent correlation matrices for conditional and unconditional 
conservatism samples respectively. Panel A of Table 3 suggests that yield spread is 
positively correlated with the firm-year conditional conservatism measure. Also, yield 
spread correlates negatively with maturity, and correlates positively with rating, issuer 
size, leverage, issue size, and business cycle. As indicated in Panel B of Table 3, the 
correlation between yield spread and firm-year unconditional conservatism is positive, 
but it is only slightly significant at 0.05 level. 
[Insert Table 3 about here]
3.3.2 Multivariate Analysis
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Equation (1) is my main regression model, in which I regress the yield spread on 
conservative reporting (proxied by the conditional and unconditional conservatism 
measure respectively), interaction term between conservative reporting and internal 
control effectiveness, firm-level and bond-level controls, and industry and year dummies. 
Panel A of Table 4 summarizes the OLS regression results with conditional conservatism. 
The coefficient for conditional conservatism (ConCon) in Specification 1 is significant 
and positive (224.96; p < 0.001), which it is inconsistent with the prediction in 
Hypothesis 1. Since the standard deviation of the conditional conservatism measure is 
0.1804, I interpret this coefficient as follows: on average, one standard deviation increase 
in ConCon will result in an increase of 36.17 (200.5*0.1804) basis points (approximately 
0.36 percent) in the yield spread, which is economically significant. This finding is 
inconsistent with the traditional debt contracting efficiency argument of conditional 
conservatism. But as discussed in Hypothesis Development Section, there exist potential 
negative effect of conditional conservatism to the market. Empirical evidence by Chan et 
al. (2010) also finds that firms with more conditional conservative reporting exhibits 
lower cost of equity. In addition, the coefficient for interaction term (ConCon*SOX404D) 
in Specification 2 is positive (267.54; p < 0.001), which supports Hypothesis 3a. It 
suggests that ineffective internal controls enhance the effect of conditional conservative 
reporting to increase the yield spread of new corporate bond issues. Overall, the 
independent variables in Specification 1 explain 65.19 percent of the variance of the 
dependent variable (yield spread) and the model is significant at the 0.001 level.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
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All the firm-level controls have the expected signs for their coefficients. The 
coefficients for issuer size (-12.35; p < 0.001) and for ROA (-222.85; p < 0.001) are 
negative. This means that larger size issuers can issue bonds at a lower cost. It 
corroborates the argument that issuer size can be a good proxy for equity risk and that 
larger size issuers benefit from the lower cost of borrowing (Khurana and Raman 2003). 
Since the standard deviation of ROA is 0.1032, I interpret the coefficient for ROA to 
mean that one standard deviation increase in ROA will result in a decrease of 22.99
(222.85*0.1032) basis points in the yield spread. In addition, the coefficient for leverage 
is positive (109.7; p < 0.001). This means that one standard deviation (0.1694) increase in 
leverage will result in an increase of 18.58 (109.7*0.1694) basis points in the yield spread. 
Overall, these results corroborate the argument from prior studies that ROA and leverage 
can be good proxy for default risk. Lower ROA and higher leverage result in a higher 
cost of borrowing (Khurana and Raman 2003; Shi 2003; Jiang 2008). 
As for the bond-level controls, most of the coefficients have the expected signs. 
The coefficient for credit rating (Rating) is negative (-97.36; p < 0.001). It means, on 
average, the yield spreads of investment grade bonds will be lower than those of non-
investment grade bonds by 97 basis points (approximately 0.97 percent). This finding 
reinforces Jiang’s (2008) argument that credit rating captures the creditworthiness of the 
issue. Consistent with prior studies, the coefficient for the business cycle is positive (1.55; 
p < 0.001) (Sengupta 1998; Jiang 2008). It means issuers will pay higher risk premiums 
for new bond issues when there is a larger divergence between Moody’s Aaa bond yields 
and 10-year U.S. Treasury bond yields for the same month. As predicted, the coefficient 
for the redeemable dummy is positive (57.26; p < 0.001), while the coefficients for the 
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putable dummy (-154.4; p < 0.001), convertible dummy (-318.39; p < 0.001), and 415 
regulation dummy (-77.76; p < 0.001) are negative. These results suggest that bond 
issuers will pay lower risk premiums for bonds that have putable and convertible features 
and that were issued under shelf registration. However, issuers will pay higher risk 
premiums for bonds that have redeemable features. The large negative coefficients for 
putable and convertible dummies further justify the negative yield spread as reported in 
the descriptive tables. However, the coefficient for maturity is negative (-14.95; p < 0.01), 
which is inconsistent with my expectation. The effect of maturity on the yield spread 
should be interpreted with caution.
Panel B of Table 4 reports the empirical results for Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 
3b. The coefficients for unconditional conservatism (UnCon) are negatively significant in 
Specification 1, which is consistent with Hypothesis 2 that bond market participants 
positively value issuers’ unconditional conservative reporting through risk premium. The 
coefficient for unconditional conservatism (UnCon) is negative (-65.28; p < 0.001). Since 
the standard deviation of the unconditional conservatism measure is 0.3515, I interpret 
this coefficient to mean that, on average, one standard deviation increase in UnCon will 
result in a decrease of 22.95 (65.28*0.3515) basis points (approximately 0.23 percent) in 
the yield spread. This finding corroborates Ahmed et al.’s (2002) empirical evidence that 
unconditional conservatism results in a lower cost of debt. The coefficient for interaction 
term (UnCon*SOX404D) is positive (128.21; p < 0.1). It suggests that ineffective internal 
controls weaken the effect of unconditional conservative reporting to reduce the yield 
spread of new corporate bond issues. However, this coefficient is only significant at 10 
percent level and it is not robust for all the sensitivity checks. Thus the moderating effect 
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of internal controls on the relation between unconditional conservatism and yield spread 
should be interpreted with caution. Overall, the independent variables in Specification 1
explain 59.27 percent of the variance of the dependent variable (yield spread) and the
model is significant at the 0.001 level. In addition, most of the coefficients for the control 
variables are statistically significant with the predicted signs. Since the dependent 
variable and all the control variables are the same for conditional and unconditional 
conservatism regressions, I do not discuss further the coefficients for control variables. 
3.4 Robustness Check
My datasets contain multiple new bond issues for a single firm for one and the 
same fiscal year. Since multi-level observations violate the assumption of residual 
independence at the lower bond-level, the standard errors from the ordinary least square 
(OLS) regression may be biased. Accordingly, I used hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) 
to handle this multi-level observation problem. Unlike OLS, HLM uses the maximum 
likelihood method to estimate coefficients. In my case, HLM accounts for the within-firm 
correlation among new bond issues by the same firm for one and the same year, and 
adjusts the estimated covariance matrix. HLM is widely used in social science research 
with multi-level observations (Ang, Slaughter and Ng 2002; Seibert, Silver and Randolph
2004). However, I also notice that, on average, a corporation issues bond only about four 
times during my sample period. This means that the number of within-firm observations 
is very limited. 36 In fact, only within-firm and within-year observations violate the 
independence assumption at the bond-level. Thus, I may overestimate the effect of intra-
                                                
36 This is different from social science research that has many within-level observations. For example, a 
research investigating the mathematical skills of high school students within a region could have school-
level and student-level variables, which allows for many observations at the within-school level.
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firm correlation among bonds issued by the same firm by employing the HLM regression. 
As a result, I only use HLM regression to conduct a robustness check. The results are 
summarized in the first 2 specifications of Table 5 and Table 7. Overall, yield spread is 
positively correlated with conditional conservatism and negatively associated with 
unconditional conservatism. In addition, the interaction effects of internal controls are 
consistent with my predictions. Thus, the main findings are robust with the HLM 
regression.
[Insert Table 5 & 7 about here]
Khan and Watts (2009) firm-year conditional conservatism measure could be bias. 
Because C_score reflects firm characteristics such as being young, having high growth 
and high leverage, which could positively related to the cost of debt. Following Givoly 
and Hayn (2000) and Zhang (2008) I use negative skewness of earnings over skewness of 
cash flow as an alternative proxy for conditional conservatism measure. Beaver and Ryan 
measure of unconditional conservatism has been criticized in the literature 
(Roychowdhury and Watts 2007). One limitation is that this measure can be picking up 
high growth firms just as much as it is picking up unconditional conservatism. 
Alternatively, I use Penman and Zhang (2002) measure as proxy for unconditional 
conservatism. Specifically, this measure of unconditional conservatism is calculated as 
the ratio of LIFO reserves plus hidden R&D and advertising reserves resulting from the 
application of unconditional conservatism to total assets. Most of the findings are 
unchanged compared to the results in the main multivatiate analysis, which are reported 
in the last 2 specifications of Table 5 and Table 7. However, the coefficient for the 
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interaction term (UnCon*SOX404D) is not significant. Thus Hypothesis 3b is not 
supported with the alternative proxy for unconditional conservatism
In the main multivariate analysis, I include credit rating as a bond-level control in 
my regression model. However, correlation analysis indicated that credit rating is 
significantly correlated with some firm-level and bond-level control variables. The credit 
rating literature justifies this phenomenon with the fact that credit rating agencies take 
into consideration the issuer’s financial information and bond features during the rating 
processes (Beaver, Shakespeare and Soliman 2006). Thus, including credit rating in the 
regression might introduce a multi-collinearity problem and bias the coefficients 
estimation. Accordingly, I run an OLS regression without credit rating as another 
robustness check. Most of the empirical results, summarized in the first 2 specifications
of Table 6 and Table 8, are consistent with the findings in the main multivariate analysis.
But Hypothesis 3b is not supported by this robustness check.
[Insert Table 6 & 8 about here]
The descriptive statistics tables indicated that a small percentage of new corporate
bond issues have convertible features. Convertible bonds are different from straight 
bonds, and linear regression models may not be appropriate to explore the relationship 
between yield spread and convertible features (Khurana and Raman 2003). As a 
robustness check, I delete these new bond issues with convertible feature and rerun the 
OLS regression. The main findings for conditional and unconditional conservatism
samples are unchanged and are reported in the last 2 specifications of Table 6 and Table 8. 
It is argued that recent subprime crisis could affect corporate bond markets. The 
relation between conservative reporting and the yield spread of new corporate bond 
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issues could be different between pre-crisis period and crisis period. I run OLS regression 
for pre-crisis sample period and crisis sample period separately as another robustness 
check.37 The empirical results are summarized in Table 9 and are consistent with the
findings in the main multivariate analysis.
[Insert Table 9 about here]
3.5 Summary
The focus of this study is the relation between conservatism and the yield spread 
of new corporate bond issues. In addition, I take into consideration the effect of internal 
control effectiveness on the above relation. More specifically, I investigate following 
research questions: (1) Whether and to what extent does conditional and unconditional 
conservative reporting influence the yield spread of new corporate bond issues? (2) 
Whether there exists an interaction effect between conservative reporting and internal 
control effectiveness on the yield spread of new corporate bond issues? The empirical 
results indicate that conditional conservatism relates to a higher yield spread of new 
corporate bond issues, which goes counter to the debt contracting efficiency argument as 
predicted in Hypothesis 1 but is consistent with my alternative interpretations of the 
negative effect of conditional conservatism. Consistent with my prediction of the effect
of unconditional conservatism, empirical findings suggest that unconditional 
conservatism relates to a lower yield spread of new corporate bond issues. With regard 
to the interaction effect, I find that ineffective internal controls enhance the effect of 
conditional conservatism to raise the yield spread of new corporate bond issues. These
                                                
37 In stead of separate sample into pre-crisis and crisis periods, I also add crisis period dummy in the full 
sample and run the OLS regression. The findings (not reported) are unchanged. 
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empirical results are unchanged with some robustness checks, e.g., using HLM 
regression instead of OLS regression, using alternative proxies for conservatism 
measures, excluding credit ratings, excluding bonds with convertible feature, and 
controlling the effect of current subprime crisis. But the finding that ineffective internal 
controls weaken the effect of unconditional conservatism to decrease the yield spread is 
not supported by all the robustness checks.
This study contributes to the existing literature on the following dimensions.  First, 
it extends the conservatism literature by providing theoretical arguments and empirical 
evidence that contrast sharply with the debt contracting efficiency view of conditional 
and unconditional conservative reporting (Ball and Shivakumar 2005). Second, this study 
complements the corporate bond literature by using a financial reporting attribute that 
directly relates to debt financing context to explain the yield spread of new corporate
bond issues. Third, this study contributes to the SOX internal control literature by 
investigating the moderating effect of internal control effectiveness under SOX 
provisions in public bond setting.
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Chapter 4 The Effect of Accounting Conservatism and Internal Control 
Effectiveness on the Underpricing of Newly Issued Corporate Bonds
4.1 Hypothesis Development
4.1.1 Conditional Conservatism and Underpricing
Among the four widely recognized explanations for accounting conservatism 
(contracting, litigation, regulation, and taxation, as per Watts 2003a, 2003b), contracting, 
especially debt contracting, is the most influential and intensively studied one.
Conditional conservatism depends on future economic circumstances. Beaver and Ryan 
(2005, p.269) define conditional conservatism as “book values are written down under 
sufficiently adverse circumstances but not written up under favorable circumstances.” 
This definition is consistent with Basu’s (1997) notion of conservatism—timely loss 
recognition. Consistent with the traditional debt contracting efficiency argument for 
conditional conservatism as predicted in Hypothesis 1, I predict that conditional 
conservatism decreases information asymmetry among contracting parties and bond 
markets will positively value it. 
More specifically, due to information asymmetry between agents and principals, 
and the limited liability and tenure of agents, agents (e.g. managers of the firm) have 
strong incentives to engage in opportunistic behaviors to maximize their own benefits at 
the expense of other contracting parties (e.g., creditors). Conditional conservatism 
mitigates information asymmetries among contracting parties, and thus alleviates adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems, as indicated by Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
Contracting theory predicts that conditional conservatism and unconditional conservatism 
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play substantially different roles in enhancing contracting efficiency. According to Ball 
and Shivakumar (2005), only conditional conservatism signals new information to 
creditors and thus enhances contracting efficiency. Timely loss recognition improves ex 
post monitoring and increases the likelihood of a debt covenant violation. In the case of a 
covenant violation, the decision rights will transfer from equity holders to debt holders. 
Thus, conditional conservative reporting serves as a platform for efficient contracting 
(Watts 2003a), especially when managers have strong incentives to overstate accounting 
numbers through their discretionary choices. 
Existing studies largely focus on private bank loan markets when testing these 
agency cost and debt contracting efficiency arguments (Wittenberg-Moerman 2008; 
Zhang 2008). Wittenbery-Moerman (2008) documents that conditional conservative 
reporting reduces the bid-ask spread in the secondary loan trade. Using four conditional 
conservatism measures, Zhang (2008) finds that the spread of the initial loan interest rate 
over the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) is negatively related to borrowers’ 
conservatism. Focusing on non-price terms of public debt contract, Nikolaev (2010) 
documents that reliance on covenants promotes conditional conservative reporting. 
The literature of equity offerings records substantial offering-date returns, a 
phenomenon called “underpricing”. The underpricing literature documents various 
explanations for the underpricing of equity offerings. The common explanation for the 
equity offering underpricing is that it solves information problems. Rock (1986) proposes 
winner’s curse explanation. Rock assumes that there exist both informed and uninformed 
investors and argues that underpricing motivates the participation of uninformed 
investors, who face a winner’s course. Underpricing is interpreted as the compensation to 
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uninformed investors for the bias in the allocation of new issues. Assuming the 
information asymmetry between management and investors, Allen and Faulhaber (1989) 
suggest a signaling explanation that, to mitigate adverse selection problem, good firms 
distinguish themselves with bad firms through underpricing. With the assumption that the 
payment for information to institutional investors in the bookbuilding process is the main 
explanation for underpricing, Sherman and Titman (2002) predicts that issuers that just 
went through the bookbuilding process would experience less underpricing. Beside 
information explanations, the literature provides other reasons for underpricing. Ellul and 
Pagano (2006) argue that underpricing compensates the risk of post-issue illiquidity. 
Booth and Chua (1996) suggest that to avoid ownership concentration, issuers may use 
underpricing to attract a large number of small shareholders. In addition, with the 
dispersed ownership, it is more difficult for outsiders to challenge management. Drake 
and Vetsuypens (1993) argue that underpricing can reduce the probability and severity of 
future lawsuit. Following this litigation argument, Lowry and Shu (2002) find that firms 
with higher litigation risk underprice their IPOs more as a form of insurance. 
This study uses conditional and unconditional conservatism to explain the 
underpricing of newly issued corporate bond. The literature implicitly documents a link 
between conservatism and information risk (Penman and Zhang 2002; Gu and Wu 2003; 
Suijs 2008; Chen et al. 2009; Garcia Lara et al. 2011). Penman and Zhang (2002) provide 
empirical evidence that unconditional conservative reporting forecasts return on net 
operating assets and stock returns. Gu and Wu (2003) document a relation between 
conditional conservatism and analyst forecast bias. Suijs (2008) find that conditional 
conservative reporting relates to a lower volatility of the stock price, which could be a 
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proxy for information risk. Chan et al. (2009) argue that unconditional conservatism 
increases the predictability of future earnings and document that unconditional 
conservative reporting results in a lower cost of equity. Garcia Lara et al. (2011) argue 
that timely loss recognition increases bad news reporting precision and reduces 
information uncertainty. Their empirical evidence suggests that conditional conservative 
reporting lowers cost of equity capital. Based on these empirical studies, I conclude that, 
to the extent that conservatism relates to the cost of capital, conservatism could proxy for 
information risk.
Relative to the underpricing literature of corporate equity offerings, the 
underpricing literature of corporate bond offerings is underdeveloped (Datta, Iskandar-
Datta and Patel 1997; Helwege and Kleiman 1998; Cai et al. 2007). Cai et al. (2007) 
argue that among the explanations of equity underpricing, information and liquidity 
explanations are more relevant to bond underpricing. Their empirical evidence support 
that information-related arguments are more relevant to bond underpricing. Signaling 
theory assumes that information asymmetry exists and indicates that issuers with less 
information problems will use underpricing to distinguish them from those with more 
information problems (Allen and Faulhaber 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang 1989). Because 
managers face adverse selection problem that investors cannot tell good firms from bad 
firms and they give the same valuation to all the firms. Cai et al. (2007) uses future 
downgrades as a proxy of information asymmetry and finds that issues with higher 
probability of future downgrades will experience less underpricing, which is consistent 
with what signaling theory predicts. In public bond context, I argue that, with less private 
information channels, public bondholders face more information asymmetry problems. 
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Conditional conservatism decreases the information asymmetry between management 
and bondholders. Accordingly, I predict that issuers with more conditional conservative 
reporting will issue bond at lower price to show their information advantage.
Hypothesis 4: Ceteris paribus, a firm’s conditional conservative reporting 
results in more underpricing for newly issued bonds. 
4.1.2 Unconditional Conservatism and Underpricing
The consistent application of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles that 
reduce earnings independent of future economic events results in unconditional 
conservatism. Accounting to the definition of unconditional conservatism by Beaver and 
Ryan (2005, p.269), “the book value of net assets is understated due to predetermined 
aspects of the accounting process.” This definition is keeping with Beaver and Ryan 
(2000) notion of conservatism—biased underestimation of book value. Consistent with 
the empirical findings in Chapter 3, my prediction of the effect of unconditional 
conservatism on bond underpricing is based on the argument that unconditional 
conservatism is positively valued by bond markets. 
More specifically, recent stream of argument suggests that unconditional 
conservatism enhances debt contracting efficiency by the commitment to 
underestimate the book value. Chan et al. (2009) argue that unconditional 
conservative reporting increases the persistence and predictability of current and 
future earnings and thus signals good quality earnings to the market. The debt 
contracting efficiency view indicates that contracting parties can undo the effect of 
unconditional conservatism by adjusting contracting terms (Ball and Shivakumar 2005). 
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For private bank loan contracting, issuers and private banks can adjust the effect of 
unconditional conservatism through either pricing terms (e.g., interest rate) or non-pricing 
terms (e.g., monitoring and covenant). What about public bond contracting? Recalling the 
argument in Section 3.1.1 that the monitoring, information, liquidation, and renegotiation
disadvantages over private debt holders make public bondholders more likely to resort to 
price terms rather than non-price terms to mitigate the information problem (Bharath et al. 
2008), I argue that public bondholders are more likely to resort to pricing terms to adjust 
the effect of unconditional conservatism ex ante. Since unconditional conservative 
reporting immunizes the bond issuers from future potential default by underestimating the 
“true” value of assets and increasing the “quality” of assets (Qiang 2007), I argue that 
unconditional conservatism decreases the perceived default risk of bond issuers and 
bondholders will positively respond to it through lower risk premium. 
To the extent unconditional conservatism underestimate book value, it will 
mitigate information asymmetry problem between management and bondholders and 
decrease the information risk of borrower. According to the previously discussed 
signaling theory of bond underpricing, I argue that issuers with more unconditional 
conservative reporting will underprice more to distinguish themselves from issuers with 
less unconditional conservative reporting. In light of these arguments, I provides 
following prediction:
Hypothesis 5: Ceteris paribus, a firm’s unconditional conservative 
reporting results in more underpricing for newly issued bonds.
4.1.3 Internal Controls and Underpricing
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Following several financial reporting scandals, the United States enacted the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in July 2002. The purpose of SOX is to improve the quality 
of corporate financial disclosures and to restore the confidence of public investors (SOX 
2002). Among its various aspects, SOX internal control provisions (Section 302 and 
Section 404) attracted much attention, leading to the emergence of two main research 
streams. One stream of research investigates the economic factors that determine internal 
control weaknesses (Ge and McVay 2005; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle 2007b; 
Hoitash et al. 2009), while another stream investigates the economic consequences of 
internal control weaknesses. Empirical evidence supports the view that internal control 
weaknesses negatively affect accruals quality (Doyle et al. 2007a; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
2008); analyst forecast behavior (Kim et al. 2009); cost of equity (Ogneva et al. 2007; 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009); cost of debt (Costello and Witternberg-Moerman 2011; 
Kim et al. 2011), management forecast (Feng et al., 2009), and stock returns (Beneish et
al. 2008).
Policymakers and regulators advocate that internal control provisions can 
eventually generate high-quality financial reporting, which will lower the cost of capital 
(U.S. House of Representatives 2005). However, the existing internal control literature 
focuses exclusively on private bank loan contracting to study the impact of SOX internal 
control weaknesses on the cost of debt. Using 788 firms that file internal control 
weakness disclosures under Section 302, Costello and Witternberg-Moerman (2011) 
examine how internal control weaknesses affect bank loan contracting terms. Overall, 
they find that: (1) After internal control weakness disclosures, lenders decrease their 
reliance on financial covenants and financial-ratio-based performance pricing provisions, 
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and lenders are more likely to require borrowers to provide additional collateral. (2) 
Material internal control weaknesses lead to increase of interest rates. Focusing on firms 
that file Section 404 disclosures for the first time, Kim et al. (2011) investigate whether 
various features of bank loan contracts differ between firms with internal control 
weakness problems and those without the problems. The empirical results are as follows: 
(1) Loan spread is about 37 basis points higher for firms with internal control weakness 
problems; (2) Firm-level internal control problems lead to higher loan rates relative to 
account-level problems; (3) Firms with internal control problems have tighter non-pricing 
terms; (4) Firms with internal control problems attract fewer lenders; and (5) Lenders 
penalize firms who failed to remediate previously disclosed internal control problems by 
charging higher loan rates, requiring collaterals, and structuring loans with fewer 
participants in syndicate loan. 
I argue that effective internal controls restrict managers’ propensity to make risky 
investments and to engage in fraudulent activities, thus decreasing operating risk. In 
addition, effective internal controls increase the perceived quality of accounting 
information and decrease the perceived information risk. This reasoning is similar to the 
argument by Kim et al. (2011) that weaknesses in internal controls increase pre-contract 
uncertainty about the creditworthiness of borrowers and information asymmetries 
between borrowers and lenders. However, only the information argument of underpricing 
is relevant when using internal control effectiveness to explain the underpricing of newly 
issued corporate bonds. Signaling argument is not applicable to internal control 
disclosure setting. Because issuer’s internal control effectiveness is publicly available 
through SOX internal control disclosure. According to information argument, issuers 
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with internal control problems may use underpricing to motivate investors’ participation
in the market and thus increasing the profit of their investment. Hence, I argue that 
issuers with more internal control problems will underprice more for newly issued bonds. 
Hypothesis 6: Ceteris paribus, issuers of newly issued bonds with effective 




This study focuses on the underpricing of newly issued corporate bonds and the 
sample for this study comes from the following databases: (1) the Mergent Fixed Income 
Securities Database (Mergent FISD) for bond-specific information; (2) the Audit 
Analytics for SOX Section 404 internal control effectiveness information; (3) the 
COMPUSTAT for bond issuers’ financial information; (4) the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) for bond issuers’ equity returns information; (5) the Trade 
Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) for bond trading information.
To test Hypothesis 4, I collect data from Mergent FISD, COMPUSTAT, CRSP, 
and TRACE. After merging the samples from the three databases, controlling for outliers, 
and eliminating the observations with missing variables, I obtain 426 observations 
(distinct newly issued bonds) from 252 firms during the 2003-2009 period.38 To test 
Hypothesis 5, I also collect data from Mergent FISD, COMPUSTAT, CRSP, and TRACE. 
                                                
38 Following Khan and Watts (2009), I delete firm years with negative total assets or book values of equity, 
and delete firm years with price per share below $1. In addition, I control outliers by eliminating firms in 
the top and bottom one percent with regard to earnings, returns, size, market-to-book ratio, and leverage. 
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After merging the samples from the three databases, controlling for outliers, and 
eliminating the observations with missing variables, I obtain 378 observations (distinct 
newly issued bonds) from 214 firms for further analysis during the 2003-2009 period.39
To test Hypothesis 6, I collect data from Mergent FISD, Audit Analytics, COMPUSTAT, 
and TRACE. After merging the samples from the three databases and eliminating the 
observations with missing variable, I obtain 400 observations (distinct newly issued 
bonds) from 254 firms during the 2005-2009 sample period.40 To control for the effect of 
outliers, I winsorize all the continuous variables in the three samples at the top and 
bottom one percent. I eliminate variable coupon and zero coupon bonds, as well as 
perpetual bonds.41 Bonds issued by public financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) are 
excluded. Since financial firms operating under different regulations, they have different 
debt financing activities than industrial firms (Khurana and Raman 2003; Bessembinder 
et al. 2009). Dick-Nielsen (2009) points out that 7.7 percent of all reports in TRACE are 
errors. Accordingly, I clean TRACE database by deleting agency transaction and input 
errors as suggested by Dick-Nielsen (2009).
4.2.2 Empirical Model
Based on prior research (Diamond 1989; Ellul and Pagano 2006; Cai et al. 2007), 
I use the following empirical models to test the effect of conservative reporting and SOX 
internal control effectiveness on the underpricing of newly issued corporate bonds:
                                                
39 Following Beaver and Ryan (2000), I control the effect of outliers by winsorizing book-to-market ratio at 
0 and 4.  
40 Small sample size is common for studies pertaining to bond markets (Dhillon and Johnson 1994; Shi 
2003). One possible explanation is that a large portion of bond issuers are non-public firms and that there is 
no equity return information available for these non-public bond issuers. 
41 According to Bessembinder et al. (2009), these bonds tend to be unique and to behave more like equities. 
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AbReturnijt !"#1 ."$1Qualityit ."$2ROAit ."$3IssueSizeijt ."$4Maturityijt + 
$5Ratingijt ." $6IssueHistoryit ." $7OfferingDijt ." $8IssueExchangeijt + 
F23*-5(C")*++,&-"."%&'(")*++,&-"."/ijt                                                (8)
According to Petersen (2009), the standard errors calculated by an OLS regression 
for panel data could be biased due to the within-firm, overtime, or across-firm residual 
correlation for a given time. Thus, I correct the standard errors of the OLS regression for 
firm-level clustering as well as for heteroscedasticity.
Dependent Variable
AbRetrun: Defined as the treasury-adjusted, daily-average, price-weighted 
abnormal bond return of the first trading date after the offering date.42 First, I calculate 
daily average, price-weighted bond return. Second, I use the difference between daily 
average, price-weighted bond return and contemporaneous U.S. Treasury return with the 
similar coupon rate and maturity to measure abnormal bond return. I require that all 
bonds included in my sample have at least one transaction within 10 trading days of the 
offering date.43 In addition, all trades included in my sample have at least $100000 par 
value (keep only institutional trades).44 Next section ‘Measurement of Variable’ provides 
                                                
42 Consistent with Easton, Monahan and Vasvari (2009), I use daily-average abnormal bond return. 
However, due to the illiquidity feature of public bond, Cai et al. (2007) use abnormal bond return as proxy 
for underpricing without adjusting the time lag between offering date and first trading date. I use abnormal 
bond return as robustness check and the results are unchanged.
43 I also restrict the first trading date within 5 trading days of the offering date. The results are unchanged 
and reported in robustness check section.
44 According to Bessembinder et al. (2009), keeping only institutional trades and weighting daily trades by 
price increases the power of the tests to detect abnormal bond return, when compared to keep all trades 
(institutional and non-institutional trades) and use the last price of the day. In robustness check section, I
keep all trades and use the last price of the day to calculate abnormal bond return. The main findings are 
robust.
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more detailed description of the approach to calculate abnormal bond return. The 
subscript ijt means bond j for firm i in year t.
Tested Variable
I employ three proxies for financial reporting quality (Quality). 1) ConCon: firm-
year conditional conservatism measure introduced by Khan and Watts (2009). 2) UnCon: 
firm-year unconditional conservatism measure introduced by Beaver and Ryan (2000). 3) 
SOX404D: a dummy variable for internal control effectiveness. This variable is 1 if a 
newly issued bond is offered after the conclusion by an auditor under SOX Section 404 
that the issuer’s internal control over financial reporting are not effective, and 0 if the 
newly issued bond is offered after the conclusion by auditor that the issuer’s internal 
control over financial reporting are effective.45
Control Variable
ROA: Return on assets of the issuer, defined as net income divided by total assets 
at the end of the fiscal year immediately prior to the corporate bond issuance date. A 
higher ROA generally implies greater profitability and I predict it is negatively related to 
the underpricing.
IssueSize:  The natural log of the par value of the bond initially issued in millions 
of dollars. According to Ellul and Pagano (2006), issue size is a proxy for aftermarket 
liquidity. A larger issue size can have a lower underpricing due to the decreased liquidity 
risk. However, Cai et al. (2007) document a positive relation between issue size and 
                                                
45 This categorization is consistent with Kim et al. (2011), who investigate the effect of internal control 
effectiveness on private bank loan contracts.
76
underpricing, and suggest that issue size is more related to information problem rather 
than liquidity issue. Thus, I do not make predictions for the sign of issue size. 
Maturity: The natural log of the number of years until the bond matures. Bond 
issues with longer maturity are perceived to be more risky than the issues with shorter 
maturity (Khurana and Raman 2003; Cai et al. 2007). Thus, maturity is expected to be 
positively related to the underpricing. 
Rating: Credit rating by Moody’s, sequentially converted to numbers from 1 
(highest rating) to 5 (lowest rating), representing the ratings of Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, and Baa 
below. For issues without Moody’s rating, Standard & Poor’s rating or Fitch rating is 
used instead (Shi 2003). Credit rating indicates the creditworthiness of the issue and thus 
is expected to be positively related to the underpricing (Cai et al. 2007).
IssueHistory: Number of years the issuer in the bond market. It is defined as the 
year of current new bond issue minus year of initial public bond offering. Diamond (1989) 
suggest that the number of years the issuer has been issuing in the bond market proxies 
for reputation. Issuer with richer history in the bond market has better reputation and thus 
it is expected to be negatively related to the underpricing.
OfferingD: A dummy variable which takes the value of one if the issuer has 
completed the public bond offering in the last twelve months and 0 otherwise. Cai et al. 
(2007) use bookbuilding process to explain the underpricing and argue that less 
underpricing for issuers that just went through the bookbuilding process. It is expected to 
be negatively related to the underpricing.
IssueExchange: A dummy variable which takes the value of one if the issuer lists 
the bond on the NYSE and 0 otherwise. Cai et al. (2007) use winner’s curse argument as 
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alternative explanation for the underpricing and suggest that greater underpricing for 
bonds listed on the NYSE relative to those listed on the dealer market. This variable is 
expected to be positively related to the underpricing. 
I include industry dummies and year dummies in the regression model to further 
control for the potential differences in issuer and issue features across industries and over 
time.
4.2.3 Measurement of Variable
Abnormal Bond Return
Consistent with Easton, Monahan and Vasvari (2009), I use following two steps 
to calculate treasury-adjusted bond return as the proxy for abnormal bond return. First, 
price-weighted bond return (BRijt) in period t for bond j issued by firm i is calculated as 
follows:
BRijt = (WPijt – OPijt-n) / OPijt-n                                                                   (9)
Where WPijt is the weighted average invoice price of bond j issued by firm i for 
transactions that occurs on day t (day n-t is the offering date and day t is the first trading 
date after the offering date). To calculate bond return, I only keep bonds that traded at 
least once within 10 trading days after the offering date. 46 Invoice bond prices are 
computed as the quoted price (also called the flat price) plus the accrued interest (AIijt) 
from the offering date. If the accrued interest is missing, I use following alternative:
AIijt = cijt * (Dijt / 360)                                                                               (10)
                                                
46 If bond trade more that one day within 10 trading days, I retain the trading date that is closest to the 
offering date.
78
Where cijt is the coupon rate for bond j issued by firm i and Dijt is the number of 
days between the trading date and offering date.  
Second, I adjust the bond return by subtracting the contemporaneous U.S. 
Treasury return (risk-free return).47 I match the new bond issues in the Mergent FISD 
database with the U.S. Treasury bond in the CRSP database by annual coupon rate and 
maturity year. Due to the illiquidity of bond, the event windows vary in length. I convert 
the treasury-adjusted, price-weighted bond return into daily average by dividing the 
number of days between the trading date and offering date (Easton et al. 2009). 
The methods to measure conditional and unconditional conservatism are 
discussed in Section 3.2.3.
4.3 Empirical Result
4.3.1 Univariate Analysis
Table 10 provides descriptive statistics of the observations for the conditional 
conservatism sample, the unconditional conservatism sample, and the internal control 
sample by year. The sample period varies across the three samples (2003-2009, 2003-
2009, and 2005-2009 for the conditional conservatism, unconditional conservatism, and 
internal control samples respectively). In total there are 426 observations in the 
conditional conservatism sample, 378 observations in the unconditional conservatism 
sample, and 400 observations in the internal control sample. Though the conditional and 
unconditional conservatism samples are based on the same sample period, the sample 
                                                
47 This eliminates the variation in bond returns that attribute to macro-economic level changes, such as 
interest rate.
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sizes for these two samples are different. This is due to the different methods used to 
calculate conditional conservatism and unconditional conservatism measures.48
[Insert Table 10 about here]
Table 11 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the conditional conservatism, 
unconditional conservatism, and internal control samples. Since my sample has both 
firm-level and bond-level variables, the number of observations used to calculate the 
descriptive statistics differ between the two types of variables. According to Panel A of 
Table 11, the average abnormal return for the conditional conservatism sample is 0.0079 
(about 0.8 percent). The minimum and maximum abnormal returns are -1.45 and 6.89 
percent respectively. The average degree of conditional conservatism is -0.0978, with a 
standard deviation of 0.1399. The average ROA of the bond issuer is 5.1%. The mean 
credit rating is 3.74, representing non-investment grade as rated by Moody’s. The mean 
(median) issue history is 14 (10) years. Approximately, it means half of the issuers have 
been in the bond market for about 10 years at the time of the new issuance. For about 
48% of the newly issued bonds, the issuers have just completed the public bond offering 
within one year before the issuance date. 22.3% of the newly issued bonds are listed in 
NYSE. Panel B of Table 11 indicates that the average abnormal return for the 
unconditional conservatism sample is 0.8 percent. The minimum and maximum abnormal 
returns are -1.96 and 8.28 percent respectively. The average degree of unconditional 
conservatism is 0.4357, with a standard deviation of 0.271. Panel C of Table 11 provides 
the descriptive statistics for the internal control sample. About ninety percent of bonds 
                                                
48 As discussed in Section 3.2.3, to measure conditional conservatism, I only need the current year’s stock 
return; whereas to calculate unconditional conservatism, I need annual returns from the past six years. 
Thus, the number of observations in the unconditional conservatism sample is less than those in the 
conditional conservatism sample.
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are issued by issuers with effective internal control over financial reporting, which is 
consistent with Kim et al.’s (2011) descriptive statistics that about 87% of sample firms 
have effective internal controls. The average abnormal return for internal control sample 
is also about 0.8 percent. The minimum and maximum abnormal returns are -2.66 and 
10.51 percent respectively.
[Insert Table 11 about here]
Table 12 and 13 represent correlation matrices for conservatism and internal 
control samples respectively. Panel A of Table 12 suggests that abnormal return is 
positively correlated with the firm-year conditional conservatism measure. It is consistent 
with what signaling argument predicts (Hypothesis 4). Also, abnormal return correlates 
negatively with ROA and correlates positively with credit ratings, which are consistent 
with my predictions. As indicated in Panel B of Table 12, the correlation between 
abnormal return and firm-year unconditional conservatism is positive, but it is not 
significant. Table 13 further indicates the negative relation between abnormal return and 
maturity, which means issue with longer maturity will experience less underpricing. In 
addition, it reports the negative but insignificant correlation between abnormal return and 
internal control effectiveness dummy.
[Insert Table 12 & 13 about here]
4.3.2 Multivariate Analysis
Equation (1) is the main regression model, in which I regress the abnormal return 
on financial reporting quality (proxied by the conditional conservatism measure, the 
unconditional conservatism measure, and the internal control dummy respectively), firm-
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level and bond-level controls, and industry and year dummies. Panel A of Table 14 
summarizes the OLS regression results with conditional conservatism as a proxy for 
financial reporting quality. The coefficients for conditional conservatism in both model 
specifications are statistically significant. In Specification 1, I exclude industry dummies 
and year dummies. The full model, Specification 2, contains all independent variables. 
My discussion is focused on the empirical results of the full model—Specification 2. The 
coefficient for conditional conservatism (ConCon) is positive (0.0165; p < 0.01). Since 
the standard deviation of the conditional conservatism measure is 0.14, I interpret this 
coefficient as follows: On average, one standard deviation increase in ConCon will result 
in an increase of 0.23 (1.65*0.14) percent in the underpricing. The positive coefficient for 
conditional conservatism supports Hypothesis 4. Hence, my empirical result does support 
signaling argument for the effect of conditional conservatism on bond underpricing. 
Overall, the independent variables in Specification 2 explained 12.39 percent of the 
variance of the dependent variable (abnormal return) and the model is significant at the 
0.001 level.49
[Insert Table 14 about here]
Some control variables have the expected signs for their coefficients. The 
coefficients for ROA (-0.0264) is negative and only significant at the 0.1 level. Since the 
standard deviation of ROA is 0.09, I interpret the coefficient for ROA to mean that one 
standard deviation increase in ROA will result in a decrease of 0.24 (2.64*0.09) percent 
in the underpricing. In addition, the coefficient for issue size is positive (0.0044; p < 
0.01). This means that one standard deviation (0.7) increase in issue size will result in an 
                                                
49 Low adjusted R2 is common for studies pertaining to bond underpricing (Datta et al. 1997; Cai et al. 
2007). The adjusted R2 range of Cai et al (2007) models is 1.7 percent to 10.1 percent. The adjusted R2
range of Datta et al. (1997) models is 5.2 percent to 11.1 percent. 
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increase of 0.31 (0.44*0.7) percent in the underpricing. The positive coefficient on issue 
size is consistent with Cai et al. (2007) finding and supports the argument that issue size 
relates more to information problem. The coefficient for credit rating is positive (0.0027; 
p < 0.01). It means, on average, that when the credit rating is upgraded (downgraded) to 
the next category, the underpricing of newly issued bonds will decrease (increase) by 
0.27 percent. This finding reinforces Cai et al. (2007) argument that credit rating captures 
the riskiness of the issue and it is positively related to the underpricing. Consistent with 
Cai et al. (2007), I do not find significant differences in the underpricing between issues 
listed in NYSE and dealer market. In addition, the coefficients for issue history 
(IssueHistory) and offering dummy (OfferingD) are not significant. Thus the results do 
not support Diamond (1989) reputation argument for bond issue history and Sherman and 
titman (2002) bookbuilding process argument for issuers that just offered new bond 
issues within one year.
Panel B of Table 14 reports the empirical results that I use to test Hypothesis 5. 
The coefficients for unconditional conservatism (UnCon) are positively significant for 
both model specifications, which is consistent with signaling argument (Hypothesis 5) 
that issuers with more unconditional conservatism reporting distinguish themselves with
those with less unconditional conservatism reporting through more underpricing of newly 
issued corporate bonds. Specifically, in Specification 2, the coefficient for unconditional 
conservatism (UnCon) is positive (0.0107; p < 0.05). Since the standard deviation of the 
unconditional conservatism measure is 0.271, I interpret this coefficient to mean that, on 
average, one standard deviation increase in UnCon will result in an increase of 0.29 
(1.07*0.271) percent in the underpricing. Overall, the independent variables in 
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Specification 2 explain 16.05 percent of the variance of the dependent variable (abnormal 
return) and the model is significant at the 0.001 level. In addition, the coefficients for 
ROA, issue size, and credit rating are statistically significant with the predicted signs. 
Since the dependent variable and all the control variables are the same for conditional and 
unconditional conservatism regressions, I do not interpret further the coefficients for 
control variables. 
Table 15 reports the results of the OLS regression of the abnormal return on the 
internal control effectiveness dummy (SOX404D), on firm-level and bond-level controls, 
and on industry and year dummies. The coefficients for the internal control effectiveness 
dummy in both specifications are insignificant, which means there is no difference in the 
underpricing of newly issued bonds between issuers with and without internal control 
problems. Thus, my Hypothesis 6 is not supported by the empirical evidence. In 
Specification 2, only the coefficient for ROA is significant (-0.0371; p < 0.01). Overall, 
the independent variables in Specification 2 explain 7.35 percent of the variance of the 
dependent variable (abnormal return) and the model is significant at the 0.001 level.
[Insert Table 15 about here]
4.4 Robustness Check
My datasets contain multiple newly issued bonds for a single firm for one and the 
same fiscal year. Since multi-level observations violate the assumption of residual 
independence at the lower bond-level, the standard errors from the ordinary least square 
(OLS) regression may be biased. Accordingly, I use hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) 
to handle this multi-level observation problem. Unlike OLS, HLM uses the maximum 
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likelihood method to estimate coefficients. In my case, HLM accounts for the within-firm 
correlation among newly issued bonds by the same firm for one and the same year, and 
adjusts the estimated covariance matrix. HLM is widely used in social science research 
with multi-level observations (Ang et al. 2002; Seibert et al. 2004). However, I also 
notice that, on average, a corporation issues bonds less than two times during the sample 
period. This means that the number of within-firm observations is very limited.50 In fact, 
only within-firm and within-year observations violate the independence assumption at the 
bond-level. Thus, I may overestimate the effect of intra-firm correlation among bonds 
issued by the same firm by employing the HLM regression. As a result, I only use HLM 
regression to conduct a robustness check. The results are summarized in Table 16. 
Overall, abnormal return is positively correlated with conditional conservatism and 
unconditional conservatism, and not significantly correlated with internal control 
effectiveness dummy. Thus, the main findings are robust with the HLM regression.
[Insert Table 16 about here]
In the main analysis, bond trades included in my sample have at least $100000 par 
value, which means non-institutional trades are excluded. As noted by Bessembinder et 
al. (2009), keeping only institutional trades increases the power of the tests to detect 
abnormal bond return, when compared to keep all trades (institutional and non-
institutional trades) regardless of the par value of each trade. The underlying assumption 
is that institutional investors are more likely taking into account issuers’ financial 
reporting quality when evaluating the newly issued bonds. However, individual investors 
are also important. As suggested by information and signaling arguments, motivating 
                                                
50 This is different from social science research that has many within-level observations. For example, a 
research investigating the mathematical skills of high school students within a region could have school-
level and student-level variables, which allows for many observations at the within-school level.
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individual investors to participate in the bond market could be the explanation of the
underpricing. As a robustness check, I keep all trades to calculate abnormal bond return. 
The main findings are robust and summarized in Table 17.
[Insert Table 17 about here]
Existing empirical studies choose different lengths of event window to calculate 
abnormal bond returns (Cai et al. 2007; Easton et al. 2009). I use 10 trading days within 
the offering date as event window in the main analysis. However, relative longer event 
window may create the biased estimation of abnormal bond return. Cai et al. (2007) 
choose relative shorter event window (five trading days) to measure abnormal return. I 
also restrict the event window within the 5 trading days after the offering date as 
robustness check. The results are consistent with the main multivariate analysis and 
reported in Table 18.
[Insert Table 18 about here]
Bessembinder et al. (2009) compare the empirical power and specification of test 
statistics that is designed to detect abnormal bond returns among frequently used methods 
of calculating abnormal bond returns. The authors find that abnormal bond return 
measured by weighting each trade by its size and eliminating non-institutional trades (par 
value of the trade >= $100,000) increases the power of the test. Following the suggestions 
by Bessembinder et al. (2009) and Easton et al. (2009), I use “daily-average, price-
weighted, trade >= $100,000” method to calculate abnormal bond return in the main 
analysis. However, prior studies also mention alternative approaches to measure 
abnormal bond returns. Bessembinder et al. (2009) introduce a method using the last 
price of the first trading date instead of the weighted price and Cai et al. (2007) measure 
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abnormal bond return without adjusting daily-average because of the illiquidity feature of 
public bond. Combining the above two alternative methods, I use the following three 
approaches to calculate abnormal bond returns: “daily-average, last price, trade >= 
$100,000”; “price-weighted, trade >= $100,000”; and “last price, trade >= $100,000”. 
The results of the OLS regressions with the alternative measures for abnormal returns are 
reported in Table 19 and the main findings are unchanged. 
[Insert Table 19 about here]
Khan and Watts (2009) firm-year conditional conservatism measure could be bias. 
Because C_score reflects firm characteristics such as being young, having high growth 
and high leverage, which could positively related to the cost of debt. Following Givoly 
and Hayn (2000) and Zhang (2008) I use negative skewness of earnings over skewness of 
cash flow as an alternative proxy for conditional conservatism measure. Beaver and Ryan 
measure of unconditional conservatism has been criticized in the literature 
(Roychowdhury and Watts 2007). One limitation is that this measure can be picking up 
high growth firms just as much as it is picking up unconditional conservatism. 
Alternatively, I use Penman and Zhang (2002) measure as proxy for unconditional 
conservatism. Specifically, this measure of unconditional conservatism is calculated as 
the ratio of LIFO reserves plus hidden R&D and advertising reserves resulting from the 
application of unconditional conservatism to total assets. The findings are unchanged 
compared to the results in the main multivatiate analysis, which are reported in Table 20. 
[Insert Table 20 about here]
4.5 Summary
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The focus of this study is the relationship between financial reporting quality and 
the underpricing of newly issued corporate bonds. More specifically, I investigate
following research questions: (1) Whether and to what extent does conditional 
conservative reporting influence the underpricing of newly issued corporate bonds? (2) 
Whether and to what extent does unconditional conservative reporting affect the 
underpricing of newly issued corporate bonds? (3) Whether and to what extent does
internal control effectiveness influence the underpricing of newly issued corporate 
bonds? The empirical results indicate that conditional conservative reporting relates to 
more abnormal return of newly issued bonds, which is consistent with the signaling 
argument (Hypothesis 4). Consistent with signaling argument for unconditional 
conservatism (Hypothesis 5), empirical findings also suggest that unconditional 
conservative reporting relates to more abnormal return of newly issued bonds. However, 
the empirical result indicates that there is no difference in terms of abnormal return 
between issuers with and without effective internal controls, which does not support my 
prediction in Hypothesis 6. My empirical results continue to hold with some robustness 
checks. Specifically, I use HLM regression instead of OLS regression, include all trades, 
use shorter trading period, choose alternative abnormal bond return measures, use 
alternative proxies for conservatism measures, and control the effect of current subprime 
crisis.
This study contributes to the academic literature along following aspects. First, it 
complements the bond underpricing literature by using financial reporting quality as 
proxy for information risk and builds up information related arguments to explain the 
underpricing of newly issued corporate bonds. Second, this study extends the 
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conservatism literature by providing theoretical arguments that differ from the traditional 
debt contracting efficiency view of unconditional conservative reporting (Ball and 
Shivakumar 2005). Third, this study contributes the SOX internal control literature by 
investigating the economic consequences of internal control effectiveness under SOX 
provisions on the underpricing of newly issued corporate bonds.
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Chapter 5 Conclusion and Discussion
The interface between financial reporting and debt financing has recently 
emerged as a fruitful focus for research (Ball et al. 2008a; Graham et al. 2008; 
Wittenberg-Moerman 2008; Zhang 2008; Sunder et al. 2009; Nikolaev 2010; Costello 
and Wittenberg-Moerman 2011; Kim et al. 2011). This stream of research is consistent 
with the argument that it is debt markets rather than equity markets shape financial 
reporting (Lev 1989; Ball and Shivakumar 2008; Ball et al. 2008b). Holthausen and 
Watts (2001) also indicate that the relevance of the accounting numbers would be 
different between equity and debt investors. However, despite the importance of public 
bond markets for U.S. corporate financing, and well-documented differences between 
public and private debt financing, current research largely focuses on the effect of 
financial reporting quality on private bank loan contracting. Prior studies only use 
financial reporting quality proxies (audit quality, analyst forecast, and operating accruals) 
that do not directly relate to the debt contracting context to explain the price terms of
public bond financing (Mansi et al. 2004; Bharath et al. 2008; Mansi et al. 2011). This 
study complements the bond financing literature by using a financial reporting attribute 
(conservatism) that is closely related to debt financing context to explain the price terms
of corporate bond financing patterns. In this dissertation, I develop alternative arguments 
of conservatism that are exclusive to the public bond market and that cannot be 
replicated to the equity market or the private debt market. With these arguments, I
investigate the effects of financial reporting quality (proxied by accounting conservatism 
and internal control effectiveness) on the yield spread of new corporate bond issues and 
the underpricing of newly issued corporate bonds.
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In Chapter 2, I discuss the background of accounting conservatism, internal 
controls, and corporate bond markets. More specifically, in Section 2.1, I summarize the 
history and definition of conservatism, the contracting demand for conservatism, and the 
classification of conservatism. In Section 2.2, I discuss the institutional background of 
internal controls with the focus of SOX internal control provisions and review the 
empirical evidence with regard to internal control effectiveness. In Section 2.3, I 
summarize the basic feature of corporate bond markets and compare the differences 
between private bank loan and public bond financing. Over all, I conclude from the prior 
literature that conservative reporting and internal control effectiveness could be good 
proxies for financial reporting quality and the literature on public bond financing is 
relatively underdeveloped. 
In Chapter 3, I investigate the main effect of accounting conservatism and the 
moderating effect of internal control effectiveness on the yield spread of new corporate
bond issues. Empirical results indicate that conditional conservatism relates to a higher
yield spread of new corporate bond issues, which means issuers with more conditional 
conservative reporting have to pay higher risk premium for new corporate bond issues. 
This finding goes counter to the debt contracting efficiency argument but is consistent 
with my discussions of the potential negative effect of conditional conservatism 
reporting (e.g., cookie-jar reserves, low information content of financial reporting, and 
costly private debt covenant violation). Overall, my empirical finding suggest that bond 
markets participants will negatively respond to conditional conservatism, which is 
corroborated by Chan et al. (2009) results that conditional conservative reporting lowers 
the cost of equity. I predict that unconditional conservative reporting increases the 
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“quality” of assets and decreases the default risk of bond issuers. Consistent with this 
anti-debt contracting efficiency argument of unconditional conservatism, empirical 
findings suggest that bond market participants positively value issuers’ unconditional 
conservative reporting with regard to risk premiums. Thus issuers with more 
unconditional conservative reporting can issue bond at lower yield spread. Finally, I take 
into consideration the moderating effect of internal controls on the relation between 
conservatism and yield spread of new corporate bond issues. My argument is that 
effective internal controls prevent managers’ opportunistic behaviors and increase the 
perceived quality of accounting information, and thus bond market participants will 
positively value effective internal controls. I document that ineffective internal controls 
enhance the effect of conditional conservatism to increase the yield spread of new 
corporate bond issues. However, empirical results only provide weak evidence that 
ineffective internal controls weaken the effect of unconditional conservatism to increase 
the yield spread of new corporate bond issues.
In Chapter 4, I investigate the effect of accounting conservatism and internal 
control effectiveness on the underpricing of newly issued corporate bonds. Empirical 
results indicate that conditional conservatism relates to more abnormal return of newly 
issued corporate bonds, which supports signaling argument for conditional conservatism.
It suggests that, in order to distinguish them from issuers with less conditional 
conservatism, bond issuers with more conditional conservative reporting would issue 
bonds at lower price. Also consistent with a signaling argument for unconditional 
conservatism, empirical findings suggest that bond issuers with more unconditional 
conservative reporting experience larger abnormal returns for the newly issued corporate 
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bonds, which means issuers with more unconditional conservative reporting would issue 
bond at lower price to signal the information advantage. I find no significant difference 
in terms of the underpricing of newly issued corporate bonds between issuers with and 
without effective internal controls, which is not consistent with my prediction. Overall, 
this study indicates that issuers with more conservative reporting issue bonds at a lower 
price. 
Besides the contributions to the academic literature, this dissertation has the
following practical implications. From a standard-setting and regulatory perspective, the
findings that conditional conservative reporting increases the yield spread of new 
corporate bond issues, and that conditional conservative reporting increases the 
underpricing of newly issued corporate bonds provide further supports to the recent trend 
toward fair value recognition in financial statements (Ryan 2008; Song et al. 2010). Also, 
policymakers may use the empirical evidence that ineffective internal controls enhance 
the effect of conditional conservatism to increase the yield spread of new corporate bond 
issues to defend the view that SOX internal control provisions actually lower the cost of 
capital for effective internal control firms (U.S. House of Representatives 2005). Because 
the assessment of cost/benefit debate of SOX internal control provisions need to go 
beyond an equity holder’s perspective and consider financial stakeholders who contract 
on the basis of financial statements. From a bond issuer and broker perspective, the
empirical results implicitly suggest that when negotiating the yield spread of new 
corporate bond issues, related parties might take issuer’s conservatism and internal 
controls into consideration. From an auditing perspective, auditors can learn from the 
finding that bond market participants value accounting conservatism differently in 
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comparison to what equity and private debt market participants do. Thus auditors would 
take capital structure into consideration when auditing their clients’ financial reports.
This dissertation has several limitations. First, my sample may not be 
representative of all public bond financings in the United States. However, I am not 
aware of any particular bias in the attributes of the sample firms, apart from the fact that 
they do not include privately-held firms. Second, the time period for the internal control 
sample is relative short. It does not include observations from 1997 to 1999, an era 
marked by the Asian, Russian and Long-Term Capital Management crises, all of which 
affect bond markets. However, my sample period captures recent events (e.g., 2008-2009 
subprime crisis) that also affect bond markets. Third, one limitation of the measures for 
conservatism is that these measures are all based on past financial reporting information. 
However, debt contract is focus on the commitment to improve future financial reporting 
quality. The existing literature only uses past conservative reporting to predict future 
conservatism practice. Fourth, I only focus on the yield spread of new corporate bond 
issues and the underpricing of newly issued corporate bonds, which are but two measures
of the cost of debt. Future research may want to extend the analysis to the relation 
between financial reporting quality and other bond market attributes, such as the liquidity 
and abnormal return of corporate seasoned bonds, and bond analysts behaviors (Chen, 
Lesmond and Wei 2007; DeFond, Hung, Karaoglu and Zhang 2008; Easton et al. 2009; 
De Franco, Vasvari and Wittenberg-Moerman 2009).
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics by Year
Issue Year
Conditional Conservatism Sample Unconditional Conservatism Sample
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
1991 151 5.88 138 5.76
1992 190 7.4 226 9.43
1993 149 5.8 211 8.81
1994 96 3.74 162 6.76
1995 93 3.62 94 3.92
1996 35 1.36 23 0.96
1997 163 6.34 111 4.63
1998 217 8.45 159 6.64
1999 114 4.44 140 5.84
2000 196 7.63 206 8.6
2001 65 2.53 49 2.05
2002 114 4.44 107 4.47
2003 222 8.64 152 6.34
2004 165 6.42 104 4.34
2005 111 4.32 84 3.51
2006 36 1.4 35 1.46
2007 43 1.67 43 1.79
2008 148 5.76 127 5.3
2009 261 10.16 225 9.39
Total 2569 100 2396 100
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics of Conservatism Samples
Panel A Conditional Conservatism Sample
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum
YieldSpread 2569 164.07 118 218.81 -345.5 850
ConCon 1475 -0.0449 -0.0542 0.1804 -0.4813 0.4164
IssuerSize 1475 7.77 7.77 1.61 4.51 11.88
ROA 1475 0.0199 0.0374 0.1032 -0.4003 0.1939
Leverage 1475 0.2638 0.2521 0.1694 0 0.6669
SOX404D 421 0.1259 0 0.3321 0 1
Maturity 2569 2.22 2.3 0.6284 0.6931 3.43
IssueSize 2569 11.42 12.07 1.98 5.45 14.22
Rating 2569 0.2153 0 0.4111 0 1
BusiCycle 2569 138.9 136 46.61 65 268
RedeemD 2569 0.5851 1 0.4928 0 1
PutD 2569 0.0646 0 0.2459 0 1
ConvertD 2569 0.1783 0 0.3828 0 1
415RegD 2569 0.6193 1 0.4857 0 1
144aRegD 2569 0.3025 0 0.4594 0 1
Panel B Unconditional Conservatism Sample
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum
YieldSpread 2396 154.05 122.1 189.1 -410 747.5
UnCon 1064 0.3435 0.3508 0.3515 -1.04 1.37
IssuerSize 1064 8.23 8.24 1.46 5.47 12.09
ROA 1064 0.0315 0.0434 0.089 -0.3066 0.1958
Leverage 1064 0.2599 0.2481 0.1661 0 1.07
SOX404D 357 0.1149 0 0.3193 0 1
Maturity 2396 2.19 2.3 0.6544 0.6931 3.47
IssueSize 2396 10.76 11.83 2.48 5.07 14.22
Rating 2396 0.2542 0 0.4355 0 1
BusiCycle 2396 137.37 134 46.86 65 268
RedeemD 2396 0.5271 1 0.4994 0 1
PutD 2396 0.0488 0 0.2156 0 1
ConvertD 2396 0.1106 0 0.3137 0 1
415RegD 2396 0.7483 1 0.4341 0 1
144aRegD 2396 0.1974 0 0.3981 0 1
Refer to Appendix 1 for the definition of the variables.
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Table 3
Correlation Matrix for Conservatism Samples
Panel A Conditional Conservatism Sample
YieldSpread IssuerSize ROA Leverage Maturity IssueSize Rating BusiCycle
IssuerSize 0.048*
ROA -0.0195 0.2273***
Leverage 0.2899*** -0.0008 -0.1553***
Maturity -0.1867*** -0.004 0.0878*** -0.1241***
IssueSize 0.1314*** -0.0157 0.0411* 0.0476* 0.0383
Rating 0.0865*** 0.3732*** 0.1875*** -0.1259*** -0.0397* 0.327***
BusiCycle 0.389*** 0.1916*** -0.0229 0.0842*** -0.1501*** 0.3124*** -0.38***
ConCon 0.1962*** -0.5509*** -0.3155*** 0.3137*** -0.1004*** 0.1128*** -0.1747*** 0.2066***
Panel B Unconditional Conservatism Sample
YieldSpread IssuerSize ROA Leverage Maturity IssueSize Rating BusiCycle
IssuerSize 0.0553**
ROA -0.0424* 0.1217***
Leverage 0.1896*** -0.0747*** -0.2204***
Maturity -0.1468*** -0.0615** 0.0612** -0.1011***
IssueSize 0.0755*** 0.0045 0.1394*** -0.4496*** 0.1198***
Rating 0.0888*** 0.3512*** 0.2136*** -0.2293*** -0.0439* 0.4364***
BusiCycle 0.4224*** 0.1959*** 0.0247 -0.0522* -0.1154*** 0.3074*** -0.3882***
UnCon 0.0445* 0.2176*** 0.276*** 0.2084*** -0.0313 -0.0609** 0.1299*** 0.0474*
Note: *, **, *** significant at the 0.05, 0.01, 0.001 level respectively.
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Table 4
Conservatism and Risk Premium
Panel A OLS Regression for Conditional Conservatism Sample
Dependent Variable: Yield Spread
Variables Predicted Sign
Specification 1 Specification 2
Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value
Intercept ? 263.45 4.05*** 241.3 1.09
ConCon - 200.5 4.99*** 228.04 1.71*
SOX404D + - - 8.47 0.29
ConCon*SOX404D + - - 267.54 2.34**
IssuerSize - -12.35 -3.35*** -0.039 -0.01
ROA - -222.85 -4.52*** -271.41 -2.13**
Leverage + 109.7 3.81*** -77.94 -0.94
Maturity + -14.95 -2.98** -21.41 1.81*
IssueSize +/- 0.14 0.07 -10.25 -0.58
Rating - -97.36 -9.98*** -238.26 -7.37***
BusiCycle + 1.55 8.89*** 2.64 8.73***
RedeemD + 57.26 6.61*** 49.38 1.38#
PutD - -154.4 -9.37*** -111.3 -2.26**
ConvertD - -318.39 -21.01*** -432.99 -10.13***
415RegD - -77.76 -4.51*** -7.32 -0.12
144aRegD + 8.45 0.47 21.95 0.36
Industry Dummy Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes
# of Observation 2569 421
Model Fit F-value: 106.62*** F-value: 46.06***
Adjusted R2 0.6519 0.7208
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Table 4 (Cont.)
Conservatism and Risk Premium
Panel B OLS Regression for Unconditional Conservatism Sample
Dependent Variable: Yield Spread
Variables Predicted Sign
Specification 1 Specification 2
Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value
Intercept ? 294.45 5.33*** 305.28 1.26
Uncon - -65.28 -3.59*** -38.67 -0.71
SOX404D + - - -43.97 -0.88
Uncon*SOX404D + - - 128.21 1.43#
IssuerSize - -20.26 -5.86*** -26.45 -2.41**
ROA - -257.69 -3.63*** -390.39 -2.34**
Leverage + 124.13 5.43*** 85.93 1.04
Maturity + -9.04 -1.72* -18.56 -1.58#
IssueSize +/- 1.8 0.84 4.41 0.23
Rating - -86.02 -8.37*** -213.22 -6.42***
BusiCycle + 1.38 7.77*** 2.48 8.38***
RedeemD + 42.82 5.12*** 48.39 1.33#
PutD - -180.51 -8.41*** -195.93 -3.15***
ConvertD - -277.82 -13.7*** -371.14 -7.97***
415RegD - -76.39 -3.82*** -38.56 -0.68
144aRegD + 3.4 0.16 -15.83 -0.28
Industry Dummy Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes
# of Observation 2396 357
Model Fit F-value: 60.31*** F-value: 31.82***
Adjusted R2 0.5927 0.7037
Note: Standard errors in the OLS regression are corrected for firm-level clustering, and 
by White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent estimator. #, *, **, *** significant at the 0.1, 
0.05, 0.01, 0.001 level respectively (two-tailed if sign not predicted).
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Table 5
Robustness Check with HLM Regression and Alternative Conditional Conservatism Measure
Yield Spread and Conditional Conservatism
Variables Predicted Sign
HLM Regression Alternative Conditional ConservatismMeasure
Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value
Intercept ? 350.86 4.39*** 296.01 1.64* 348.45 5.67*** -445.13 1.82#
ConCon - 99.18 3.63*** 212.4 2.07* 3.63 3.73*** 2.35 1.95*
SOX404D + - - 23.59 0.8 - - -7.52 -0.23
ConCon*SOX404D + - - 297.24 2.36** - - 17.27 1.77*
IssuerSize - -21.19 -5.68*** 3.54 0.29 -24.42 -8.46*** -2.13 -0.18
ROA - -211.99 -6.1*** -188.05 -1.94* -228.47 -4.41*** -299.26 -2.38**
Leverage + 121.45 5.17*** -15.48 -0.22 164.39 5.84*** 15.73 0.2
Maturity + -4.92 -1.18 -5.94 -0.64 -16.32 -3.23** -15.11 -1.25
IssueSize +/- -1.93 -0.91 -18.81 -1.44# -1.05 0.54 -11.48 -0.64
Rating - -66.8 -8.72*** -184.4 -6.86*** -100.02 -10.3*** -133.07 -7.39***
BusiCycle + 1.56 15.85*** 2.75 13.7*** 1.58 9.01*** 2.89 9.7***
RedeemD + 34.17 5.46*** 4.78 0.19 58.28 6.65*** -11.93 -0.31
PutD - -157.66 -12.7*** -138.39 -3.54*** -155.04 -9.44*** -47.26 -0.95
ConvertD - -294.43 -31.7*** -395.31 -13.8*** -323.18 -20.6*** -437.95 9.58***
415RegD - -70.51 -7.16*** -35.59 -1.11 -79.87 -4.63*** -44.67 -0.86
144aRegD + -13.73 -1.37# -28.72 -0.86 15.57 0.86 35.87 0.67
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Observation 2569 421 2522 405
Model Fit Deviance: 2394.9*** Deviance: 561.4*** F-value: 162.5*** F-value: 151.04***
Adjusted R2 0.5691 0.7719 0.6529 0.7168
Note: Standard errors in the OLS regression are corrected for firm-level clustering, and by White’s heteroscedasticity-
consistent estimator. #, *, **, *** significant at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01, 0.001 level respectively (two-tailed if sign not predicted). 
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Table 6
Robustness Check with Exclude Rating and Exclude Convertible Bond
Yield Spread and Conditional Conservatism
Variables Predicted Sign
Exclude Rating Exclude Convertible Bond
Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value
Intercept ? 210.98 3.8*** 61.66 0.25 183.39 2.95** -90.35 -0.39
ConCon - 245.03 6.75*** 380.53 2.56** 210.93 4.9*** 248.56 2.08*
SOX404D + - - 13.18 0.4 - - -5.27 -0.16
ConCon*SOX404D + - - 182.47 1.33# - - 287.27 2.3*
IssuerSize - -12.57 -3.62*** -24.01 -1.68* -15.81 -4.01*** -19.52 -1.41#
ROA - -257.98 -5.38*** -299.06 -2.12* -347.14 -4.34*** -285.7 -1.91*
Leverage + 141.83 5.17*** 24.09 0.26 112.67 3.57*** -82.43 -1.05
Maturity + -7.37 -1.88* -29.04 -2.24* 0.14 0.03 -8.99 -0.79
IssueSize +/- 2.2 1.23 11.93 0.59 0.69 0.38 7.66 0.39
Rating - - - - - -91.52 -9.79*** -207.23 -6.49***
BusiCycle + 1.24 7.63*** 2.52 7.64*** 1.72 9.94*** 2.79 9.38***
RedeemD + 41.33 6.17*** 27.64 0.78 56.01 6.84*** 53.84 1.05
PutD - -167.22 -10.3*** -119.65 -2.24* -170.67 -4.77*** -288.45 -3.04**
ConvertD - -287.12 -19.2*** -364.57 -8.7*** - - - -
415RegD - -67.76 -4.54*** -54.47 -0.9 -30.05 -1.84* 109.38 1.5#
144aRegD + 21.04 1.33# 47.18 0.8 89.67 4.8*** 185.81 2.33**
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Observation 3730 427 2111 332
Model Fit F-value: 87.97*** F-value: 41.02*** F-value: 76.65*** F-value: 187.51***
Adjusted R2 0.6101 0.6578 0.6638 0.6905
Note: Standard errors in the OLS regression are corrected for firm-level clustering, and by White’s heteroscedasticity-
consistent estimator. #, *, **, *** significant at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01, 0.001 level respectively (two-tailed if sign not predicted). 
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Table 7
Robustness Check with HLM Regression and Alternative Unconditional Conservatism Measure
Yield Spread and Unconditional Conservatism
Variables Predicted Sign
HLM Regression Alternative Unconditional ConservatismMeasure
Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value
Intercept ? 260.15 4.82*** 373 1.96* 348.45 5.67*** 244.73 0.88
UnCon - -32.13 -2.2* -104.99 -2.17* -55.77 -3.32*** -15.97 -0.43
SOX404D + - - -1.93 -0.04 - - 34.05 0.91
UnCon*SOX404D + - - 135.26 1.35# - - -78.05 -0.9
IssuerSize - -25.96 -6.12*** -20.5 -1.72* -27.51 -7.32*** -32.33 -2.72**
ROA - -215.04 -4.53*** -232.64 -1.79* -370.37 -5.68*** -441.49 -2.88**
Leverage + 171.34 7.43*** 139.81 1.88* 97.83 4.29*** 60.14 0.71
Maturity + 4.51 1.1 5.62 0.65 -4.3 -0.7 -12.01 -1.01
IssueSize +/- 1.94 1.1 -7.13 -0.52 -2.44 -0.91 6.27 0.31
Rating - -49.47 -6.4*** -152.36 -5.35*** -86.12 -8.12*** -193.45 -5.44***
BusiCycle + 1.33 13.58*** 2.48 12.86*** 1.49 7.21*** 2.56 8.27***
RedeemD + 20.17 3.55*** 31.14 1.22 57.53 5.9*** 60.84 1.42#
PutD - -174.94 -12.4*** -242.03 -6.14*** -173.99 -8.05*** -190.56 -2.81**
ConvertD - -239.92 -21.37*** -306.96 -10.24*** -323.57 -17.1*** -375.93 -7.01***
415RegD - -50.79 -4.61*** -56.91 -1.62# -60.19 -2.88** -20.01 -0.31
144aRegD + -4.41 -0.37 -62.75 -1.68* 26.94 1.2 23.68 0.37
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Observation 2396 357 1917 326
Model Fit Deviance: 2027.4*** Deviance: 691.3*** F-value: 55.8*** F-value: 34.19***
Adjusted R2 0.4884 0.781 0.6303 0.719
Note: Standard errors in the OLS regression are corrected for firm-level clustering, and by White’s heteroscedasticity-
consistent estimator. #, *, **, *** significant at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01, 0.001 level respectively (two-tailed if sign not predicted). 
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Table 8 
Robustness Check with Exclude Rating and Exclude Convertible Bond
Yield Spread and Unconditional Conservatism
Variables Predicted Sign
Exclude Rating Exclude Convertible Bond
Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value
Intercept ? 321.17 6.48*** 110.42 0.42 258.93 4.62*** -41.93 -0.18
UnCon - -68.52 -4.19*** -66.79 -1.21 -69.92 -3.89*** -123.96 2.78**
SOX404D + - - -22.76 -0.44 - - -47.08 -0.86
UnCon*SOX404D + - - 112.2 1.16 - - 142.57 1.48#
IssuerSize - -22.87 -6.74*** -53.78 -4.57*** -24.49 -7.27*** -47.89 -4.76**
ROA - -318.77 -4.49*** -508.01 -2.62** -446.98 -4.88*** -375.37 -2.03*
Leverage + 147.51 6.33*** 198.63 2.33** 103.62 4.54*** 61.52 0.85
Maturity + -1.58 -0.36 -23.59 -1.79* 1.47 0.3 2.59 0.27
IssueSize +/- 0.86 0.46 30.04 1.46# 0.35 0.19 32.01 1.74*
Rating - - - - - -83.83 -8.8*** -181.95 -6.27***
BusiCycle + 1.12 6.49 2.3 7.94*** 1.6 9.44 2.71 10.15***
RedeemD + 37.16 5.55*** 38.84 1.04 45.43 6.13*** 16.67 0.37
PutD - -192.65 -9.16*** -187.99 -3.06** -155.54 -4.13*** -589.22 -4.7***
ConvertD - -248.47 -12.4*** -315.23 -6.69*** - - - -
415RegD - -62.11 -3.49*** -73.24 -1.36# -25.16 -1.32# 14.73 0.28
144aRegD + 17.79 0.92 31.08 0.58 87.68 4.18*** 79.55 1.35#
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Observation 3301 359 2131 294
Model Fit F-value: 51.91 F-value: 35.8 F-value: 51.57 F-value: 28.15
Adjusted R2 0.5504 0.6495 0.6189 0.7028
Note: Standard errors in the OLS regression are corrected for firm-level clustering, and by White’s heteroscedasticity-
consistent estimator. #, *, **, *** significant at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01, 0.001 level respectively (two-tailed if sign not predicted). 
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Table 9
Robustness Check with subsample of pre-crisis and crisis period
Yield Spread and Conservatism
Variables Predicted Sign
Conditional Conservatism Unconditional Conservatism
Pre-Crisis Period Crisis Period Pre-Crisis Period Crisis Period
Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value
Intercept ? 318.64 4.86*** 220.51 1.16 330.04 5.66*** 395.75 1.63#
Conservatism 176.53 4.46*** 420.45 2.86** -57.1 -2.82** -82.73 -1.98*
IssuerSize - -12.56 -3.37*** -4.3 -0.36 -19.02 -5.29*** -28.68 -3.01**
ROA - -206.81 -3.73*** -286.78 -2.53** -246.62 -3.01** -222.14 -1.55#
Leverage + 111.48 3.72*** 41.8 0.49 121.91 4.99*** 160.65 2.29*
Maturity + -7.34 -1.41# -19.47 -1.64# -2.37 -0.41 -14.85 -1.27
IssueSize +/- -0.11 -0.06 -17.88 -1.38# 1.22 0.57 -10.69 -0.69
Rating - -68.68 -6.75*** -245.64 -7.52*** -66.6 -6.08*** -201.13 -6.18***
BusiCycle + 0.83 4.47*** 3.08 11.58*** 0.76 3.94*** 2.83 10.29***
RedeemD + 59.78 6.83*** 35.18 0.72 43.95 4.95*** 9.28 0.26
PutD - -160.77 -9.3*** -199.67 -3.16*** -182.41 -8.11*** -281.46 -3.87***
ConvertD - -314.55 -18.7*** -426.92 -7.77*** -271.71 -11.7*** -370.12 -7.46***
415RegD - -80.43 -4.71*** -37.47 -0.52 -79.78 -3.96*** -9.58 -0.13
144aRegD + 6.67 0.37 -31.95 -0.42 -6.05 -0.28 43.8 0.55
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Observation 2160 409 2044 352
Model Fit F-value: 120.09*** F-value: 47.49*** F-value: 43.86*** F-value: 40.05***
Adjusted R2 0.6039 0.6662 0.5215 0.6269
Note: Standard errors in the OLS regression are corrected for firm-level clustering, and by White’s heteroscedasticity-
consistent estimator. #, *, **, *** significant at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01, 0.001 level respectively (two-tailed if sign not predicted). 
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Table 10











Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
2003 19 4.46 18 4.76
2004 15 3.52 15 3.97
2005 33 7.75 30 7.94 20 5
2006 14 3.29 8 2.12 39 9.75
2007 24 5.63 22 5.82 80 20
2008 120 28.17 103 27.25 82 20.5
2009 201 47.18 182 48.14 179 44.75
Total 426 100 378 100 400 100
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Table 11
Descriptive Statistics of Variable
Panel A Conditional Conservatism Sample
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum
AbReturn 426 0.0079 0.0042 0.0142 -0.0145 0.0689
ConCon 252 -0.0978 -0.095 0.1399 -0.4397 0.2774
ROA 252 0.051 0.0551 0.0893 -0.3526 0.273
IssueSize 426 13.06 13.12 0.7113 11.35 14.62
Maturity 426 2.19 2.3 0.66 0.6931 3.43
Rating 426 3.74 4 0.9593 1 5
IssueHistory 426 14.21 10.13 12.01 0 42.67
OfferingD 426 0.4765 0 0.5 0 1
IssueExchange 426 0.223 0 0.4168 0 1
Panel B Unconditional Conservatism Sample
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum
AbReturn 378 0.0081 0.0041 0.0155 -0.0196 0.0828
UnCon 214 0.4357 0.4569 0.271 -0.2646 0.9141
ROA 214 0.0575 0.0598 0.0828 -0.342 0.273
IssueSize 378 13.08 13.12 0.7025 11.29 14.63
Maturity 378 2.19 2.3 0.6814 0.6931 3.43
Rating 378 3.65 4 0.9448 1 5
IssueHistory 378 15.94 11.78 12.25 0 42.69
OfferingD 378 0.4709 0 0.4998 0 1
IssueExchange 378 0.246 0 0.4313 0 1
Panel C Internal Control Sample
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum
AbReturn 400 0.0079 0.0041 0.0167 -0.0266 0.1051
Sox404D 254 0.0945 0 0.2931 0 1
ROA 254 0.0493 0.0592 0.0959 -0.3894 0.2429
IssueSize 400 12.95 12.9 0.6756 11.23 14.63
Maturity 400 2.24 2.3 0.6649 0.6931 3.43
Rating 400 3.95 4 0.9025 1 5
IssueHistory 400 14.8 10.99 12.68 0 47.43
OfferingD 400 0.42 0 0.4942 0 1
IssueExchange 400 0.1925 0 0.3948 0 1
Refer to Appendix 2 for the definition of the variables.
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Table 12
Correlation Matrix for Conservatism Sample
Panel A Conditional Conservatism
AbReturn ROA Bondsize Maturity Rating IssueHistory OfferingD IssueExchange
ROA -0.2237***
Bondsize -0.0656 0.0868#
Maturity -0.0131 0.0421 0.0775
Rating 0.1886*** -0.3293*** -0.4323*** -0.0633
IssueHistory -0.0656 0.1533** -0.0037 0.0064 -0.2135***
OfferingD 0.0533 -0.0984* 0.2686*** 0.0421 -0.1376** -0.1619***
IssueExchange 0.0522 -0.0514 0.027 -0.0027 -0.0629 0.1034* -0.0143
ConCon 0.1569** -0.1924*** -0.4901*** -0.1725*** 0.4253*** -0.017 -0.2321*** 0.0203
Panel B Unconditional Conservatism
AbReturn ROA Bondsize Maturity Rating IssueHistory OfferingD IssueExchange
ROA -0.2802***
Bondsize 0.0372 0.0965#
Maturity -0.0032 0.0562 0.0736
Rating 0.1972*** -0.3019*** -0.4394*** -0.0707
IssueHistory -0.0307 0.079 -0.0345 0.0081 -0.1558**
OfferingD 0.0475 -0.0377 0.3111*** 0.0072 -0.1792*** -0.1416**
IssueExchange 0.0787 -0.0465 0.0047 -0.0151 -0.0393 0.1062* -0.0713
UnCon 0.0179 0.3452*** 0.2161*** -0.0111 -0.3892*** 0.2316*** 0.0509 -0.0809
Note: #, *, **, *** significant at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01, 0.001 level respectively.
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Table 13
Correlation Matrix for Internal Control Sample
AbReturn ROA Bondsize Maturity Rating IssueHistory OfferingD IssueExchange
ROA -0.1975***
Bondsize -0.0166 0.2703***
Maturity -0.0996* 0.0731 0.0655
Rating 0.0889# -0.3693*** -0.4845*** 0.0106
IssueHistory -0.0005 0.0424 0.0052 0.0159 -0.1816***
OfferingD 0.0237 -0.0918 0.1564** 0.0002 -0.0596 -0.089#
IssueExchange 0.0389 0.0855# 0.1028* -0.0473 -0.1699*** 0.1551** -0.0558
SOX404D -0.0125 -0.0808 -0.1703*** -0.0507 0.1613** 0.0023 0.0375 -0.0941#




Panel A OLS Regression for Conditional Conservatism Sample
Dependent Variable: AbReturn
Variables Predicted Sign
Specification 1 Specification 2
Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value
Intercept ? -0.0505 -2.58* -0.0626 -3.21***
ConCon + 0.0177 2.97** 0.0165 2.81**
ROA - -0.0243 -1.74* -0.0264 -1.91*
IssueSize +/- 0.0039 2.89** 0.0044 3.23***
Maturity + 0.0003 0.32 0.0006 0.6
Rating + 0.0024 2.89** 0.0027 3.12***
IssueHistory - -0.0001 -0.04 -0.0001 -0.61
OfferingD - 0.0013 0.84 0.0015 0.96
IssueExchange + 0.0016 0.77 0.0015 0.71
Industry Dummy No Yes
Year Dummy No Yes
Model Fit F-value: 4.45*** F-value: 3.42***




Panel B OLS Regression for Unconditional Conservatism Sample
Dependent Variable: AbReturn
Variables Predicted Sign
Specification 1 Specification 2
Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value
Intercept ? -0.0446 -1.98* -0.0584 -2.61**
UnCon + 0.0114 2.37** 0.0107 2.13*
ROA - -0.0536 -2.96** -0.0531 -2.97**
IssueSize +/- 0.0026 1.81* 0.003 2.15*
Maturity + 0.0006 0.51 0.0008 0.75
Rating + 0.0041 3.12*** 0.0044 3.31***
IssueHistory - -0.0001 -0.29 -0.0001 -0.51
OfferingD - 0.0012 0.71 0.0012 0.69
IssueExchange + 0.0034 1.44# 0.0032 1.34#
Industry Dummy No Yes
Year Dummy No Yes
Model Fit F-value: 3.15*** F-value: 3.61***
Adjusted R2 0.145 0.1605
Note: Standard errors in the OLS regression are corrected for firm-level clustering, and 
by White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent estimator. #, *, **, *** significant at the 0.1, 
0.05, 0.01, 0.001 level respectively (two-tailed if sign not predicted).
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Table 15
Internal Control and Underpricing
OLS Regression for Internal Control Sample
Dependent Variable: AbReturn
Variables Predicted Sign
Specification 1 Specification 2
Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value
Intercept ? -0.0099 -0.44 -0.023 -1.04
SOX404D + -0.0017 -0.77 -0.0019 -0.82
ROA - -0.0369 -2.81** -0.0371 -2.69**
IssueSize +/- 0.0015 0.99 0.0018 1.17
Maturity + -0.0022 -1.72* -0.0019 -1.35#
Rating + 0.0012 0.94 0.0018 1.33#
IssueHistory - 0.0001 0.23 0.0001 0.28
OfferingD - 0.0002 0.1 0.0002 0.1
IssueExchange + 0.0022 0.85 0.0025 0.94
Industry Dummy No Yes
Year Dummy No Yes
Model Fit F-value: 1.7# F-value: 3.04***
Adjusted R2 0.0537 0.0735
Note: Standard errors in the OLS regression are corrected for firm-level clustering, and 
by White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent estimator. #, *, **, *** significant at the 0.1, 
0.05, 0.01, 0.001 level respectively (two-tailed if sign not predicted).
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Table 16
Robustness Check with HLM Regression
HLM Regression for All Three Samples
Dependent Variable: AbReturn
Variables Predicted Sign
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Conditional Conservatism Unconditional Conservatism Internal Control
Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value
Intercept ? -0.052 -2.84** -0.0443 -2.06* -0.0198 -0.87
Quality + 0.0159 2.57** 0.009 2.36** -0.0019 -0.58
ROA - -0.0311 -3.36*** -0.0599 -5.22*** -0.0361 -3.24***
IssueSize +/- 0.0037 3.09** 0.0021 1.59# 0.0016 1.04
Maturity + 0.0003 0.34 0.0008 0.72 -0.0022 -1.77*
Rating + 0.0025 2.57** 0.0038 3.43*** 0.0018 1.46#
IssueHistory - -0.0001 -0.52 -0.0001 -0.27 0.0001 0.48
OfferingD - 0.0013 0.9 0.0014 0.86 0.0001 0.01
IssueExchange + 0.0028 1.74* 0.0046 2.58** 0.0029 1.35#
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes
Model Fit Deviance: 50.8***; d.f.: 21 Deviance: 57.6***; d.f.: 21 Deviance: 26.9***; d.f.: 19
Adjusted R2 0.067 0.063 0.0435
Note: #, *, **, *** significant at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01, 0.001 level respectively (two-tailed if sign not predicted).
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Table 17
Robustness Check with All Trades Included
OLS Regression for All Three Samples
Dependent Variable: AbReturn
Variables Predicted Sign
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Conditional Conservatism Unconditional Conservatism Internal Control
Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value
Intercept ? -0.0622 -3.19** -0.0575 -2.65** -0.024 -1.14
Quality + 0.0161 2.72** 0.0095 2.04* -0.002 -0.9
ROA - -0.0268 -1.93* -0.0493 -3.03** -0.0379 -2.83**
IssueSize +/- 0.0044 3.23*** 0.003 2.21* 0.0018 1.26
Maturity + 0.0006 0.56 0.0009 0.84 -0.0017 -1.29#
Rating + 0.0026 3.05** 0.0042 3.34*** 0.0019 1.42#
IssueHistory - -0.0001 -0.62 -0.0001 -0.61 0.0001 0.32
OfferingD - 0.0014 0.9 0.0012 0.71 -0.0001 -0.06
IssueExchange + 0.0015 0.73 0.0029 1.3# 0.0023 0.92
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes
# of Observation 428 378 399
Model Fit F-value: 3.36*** F-value: 3.75*** F-value: 3.13***
Adjusted R2 0.1221 0.159 0.0795
Note: Standard errors in the OLS regression are corrected for firm-level clustering, and by White’s heteroscedasticity-
consistent estimator. #, *, **, *** significant at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01, 0.001 level respectively (two-tailed if sign not predicted).
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Table 18
Robustness Check with Shorter Trading Period
OLS Regression for All Three Samples
Dependent Variable: AbReturn
Variables Predicted Sign
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Conditional Conservatism Unconditional Conservatism Internal Control
Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value
Intercept ? -0.0622 -3.07** -0.0572 -2.48* -0.0189 -0.8
Quality + 0.0169 2.76** 0.011 2.16* -0.0021 -0.91
ROA - -0.0264 -1.87* -0.0539 -2.94** -0.0368 -2.66**
IssueSize +/- 0.0044 3.1** 0.0029 2.03* 0.0015 0.89
Maturity + 0.0006 0.55 0.0008 0.72 -0.0018 -1.23
Rating + 0.0026 2.97** 0.0043 3.19*** 0.0017 1.22
IssueHistory - -0.0001 -0.76 -0.0001 -0.65 0.0001 0.27
OfferingD - 0.0016 0.99 0.0013 0.74 0.0001 0.07
IssueExchange + 0.0014 0.67 0.0031 1.28 0.0023 0.86
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes
# of Observation 415 368 391
Model Fit F-value: 3.29*** F-value: 3.69*** F-value: 3.03***
Adjusted R2 0.1222 0.1611 0.072
Note: Standard errors in the OLS regression are corrected for firm-level clustering, and by White’s heteroscedasticity-
consistent estimator. #, *, **, *** significant at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01, 0.001 level respectively (two-tailed if sign not predicted).
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Table 19
Robustness Check with Alternative Methods for Abnormal Bond Return
Panel A OLS Regression for Conditional Conservatism Sample
Dependent Variable: AbReturn
Variables Predicted Sign
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Daily Ave., Last Price, Trade>=10K Weighted Price, Trade>=10K Last Price, Trade>=10K
Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value
Intercept ? -0.0603 -2.93** -0.051 -1.82# -0.0485 -1.63#
ConCon + 0.0171 2.8** 0.0235 2.4** 0.0229 2.26*
ROA - -0.0288 -1.8* -0.0456 -2.16* -0.0454 -2.09*
IssueSize +/- 0.0043 2.99** 0.0033 1.65* 0.0032 1.5#
Maturity + 0.0005 0.47 0.0001 0.01 -0.0001 -0.06
Rating + 0.0025 2.81** 0.0038 2.74** 0.0036 2.45**
IssueHistory - -0.0001 -0.73 -0.0001 -0.5 -0.0001 -0.78
OfferingD - 0.0017 1.08 0.003 1.09 0.0034 1.18
IssueExchange + 0.0023 1.06 -0.0003 -0.09 0.0012 0.38
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes
Model Fit F-value: 2.8*** F-value: 3.3*** F-value: 2.88***
Adjusted R2 0.1185 0.1071 0.0984
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Table 19 (Cont.)
Robustness Check with Alternative Methods for Abnormal Bond Return
Panel B OLS Regression for Unconditional Conservatism Sample
Dependent Variable: AbReturn
Variables Predicted Sign
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Daily Ave., Last Price, Trade>=10K Weighted Price, Trade>=10K Last Price, Trade>=10K
Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value
Intercept ? -0.0567 -2.43* -0.0475 -1.23 -0.0427 -1.05
UnCon + 0.0116 2.14* 0.0168 1.94* 0.0185 2*
ROA - -0.0597 -2.86** -0.0982 -3.05** -0.1065 -3.02**
IssueSize +/- 0.0028 1.98* 0.0013 0.51 0.0009 0.34
Maturity + 0.0008 0.66 0.0007 0.32 0.0007 0.31
Rating + 0.0044 3.09** 0.0071 3.06** 0.0069 2.8**
IssueHistory - -0.0001 -0.58 -0.0001 -0.11 -0.0001 -0.25
OfferingD - 0.0016 0.88 0.0027 0.82 0.0036 1.04
IssueExchange + 0.0044 1.73* 0.0023 0.62 0.0041 1.06
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes
Model Fit F-value: 4.88*** F-value: 3.67*** F-value:4.47***
Adjusted R2 0.1654 0.1362 0.1375
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Table 19 (Cont.)
Robustness Check with Alternative Methods for Abnormal Bond Return
Panel C OLS Regression for Internal Control Sample
Dependent Variable: AbReturn
Variables Predicted Sign
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Daily Ave., Last Price, Trade>=10K Weighted Price, Trade>=10K Last Price, Trade>=10K
Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value
Intercept ? -0.02 -0.88 -0.0115 -0.37 -0.0063 -0.19
SOX404D + -0.0025 -1.21 -0.0003 -0.06 -0.0013 -0.34
ROA - -0.0345 -2.43** -0.0581 -2.83** -0.0532 -2.46**
IssueSize +/- 0.0016 1 0.0007 0.33 0.0004 0.15
Maturity + -0.0021 -1.47# -0.0018 -0.86 -0.0021 -1
Rating + 0.0017 1.22 0.0025 1.31# 0.0023 1.17
IssueHistory - 0.0001 0.21 0.0001 0.52 0.0001 0.38
OfferingD - 0.0004 0.19 0.0009 0.29 0.0014 0.48
IssueExchange + 0.0029 1.1 0.0026 0.72 0.0038 1.03
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes
Model Fit F-value: 3.16*** F-value: 4.1*** F-value: 3.96***
Adjusted R2 0.0707 0.0825 0.0759
Note: Standard errors in the OLS regressions are corrected for firm-level clustering, and by White’s heteroscedasticity-
consistent estimator. #, *, **, *** significant at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01, 0.001 level respectively (two-tailed if sign not predicted).
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Table 20







Coefficient T-value Coefficient T-value
Intercept ? -0.0536 -2.83** -0.0559 -1.86*
Conservatism ? 0.0002 2.21* 0.0637 1.87*
ROA + -0.0369 -2.81** -0.0671 -3.85***
IssueSize - 0.0015 0.99 0.0036 1.94*
Maturity +/- -0.0022 -1.72* 0.0009 0.64
Rating + 0.0012 0.94 0.0046 3.01**
IssueHistory + 0.0001 0.23 0.0001 0.19
OfferingD - 0.0002 0.1 0.0016 0.68
IssueExchange - 0.0022 0.85 0.0035 1.18
Industry Dummy Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes
# of Observation 426 264
Model Fit F-value: 3.27*** F-value: 3.93***
Adjusted R2 0.1178 0.2145
Note: Standard errors in the OLS regressions are corrected for firm-level clustering, and 
by White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent estimator. #, *, **, *** significant at the 0.1, 
0.05, 0.01, 0.001 level respectively (two-tailed if sign not predicted).
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Appendix 1 Variable Definition for Yield Spread
Variable Definition
YieldSpread The initial corporate bond yield minus the Treasury bond yield with comparable maturity.
ConCon Firm-year conditional conservatism measure introduced by Khan and Watts (2009).
UnCon Firm-year unconditional conservatism measure introduced by Beaver and Ryan (2000).
SOX404D
A dummy for the bond issue cutoff. 1 if a bond issue is offered after the conclusion by auditor under SOX 
Section 404 that issuer’s internal control over financial reporting is not effective, and 0 if offered after the 
conclusion by auditor that issuer’s internal control over financial reporting is effective. 
IssuerSize The natural log of issuer's assets at end of the fiscal year immediately prior to the new corporate bond issuance date.
ROA Return on assets of the issuer, defined as net income divided by total assets at the end of the fiscal year immediately prior to the new corporate bond issuance date.
Leverage Long term debt divided by total assets of the issuer at the end of the fiscal year immediately prior to the new corporate bond issuance date.
Zscore
Altman Z-score, which is introduced by Altman (1968), is conmputed as follows: 1.2*(working 
capital/total assets) + 1.4*(retained earnings/total assets) + 3.3*(earnings before interest and taxes/total 
assets) + 0.6*(market value of equity/book value of total debt) + 1.0*(sales/total assets).
BusiCycle The difference between the average yield of Moody's Aaa bonds for the month of issue and the average yield of 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds for the month of issue.
Maturity The natural log of the number of years until the bond matures.
IssueSize The natural log of the par value of the bond initially issued in millions of dollars.
Rating
Bond rating by Moody's, sequentially converted to numbers, with 1 for AAA through 21 for C, 26 for 
"CUSP", and 27 for "NR". For issues without Moody's rating, Standard & Poor's rating and Fitch rating are 
used instead. 
RedeemD A dummy variable for the call feature of the bond. 1 for bond has an embedded call option and 0 otherwise.
PutD A dummy variable for the put feature of the bond. 1 for bond has an embedded put option and 0 otherwise.
ConvertD A dummy variable for the convert feature of the bond. 1 for bond has an embedded convert option and 0 otherwise.
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415RegD A dummy variable for the SEC Rule 415 shelf registration feature of the bond. 1 for bond is issued under a shelf registration and 0 otherwise.
144aRegD A dummy variable for the SEC Rule 144a private placement feature of the bond. 1 for bond is issued through private placement exempt from registration and 0 otherwise.
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Appendix 2 Variable Definition for Underpricing
Variable Definition
AbReturn
Defined as the treasury-adjusted, daily-average, weighted price abnormal bond return of the first trading 
date after the offering date. First, we calculate daily average, weighted price bond return. Second, we use 
the difference between daily average, weighted price bond return and contemporaneous U.S. Treasury 
return with the similar coupon rate and maturity to measure abnormal bond return. 
ConCon Firm-year conditional conservatism measure introduced by Khan and Watts (2009).
UnCon Firm-year unconditional conservatism measure introduced by Beaver and Ryan (2000).
SOX404D
A dummy for the bond issue cutoff. 1 if a bond issue is offered after the conclusion by auditor under SOX 
Section 404 that issuer’s internal control over financial reporting is not effective, and 0 if offered after the 
conclusion by auditor that issuer’s internal control over financial reporting is effective. 
ROA Return on assets of the issuer, defined as net income divided by total assets at the end of the fiscal year immediately prior to the corporate bond issuance date.
IssueSize The natural log of the par value of the bond initially issued in millions of dollars.
Maturity The natural log of the number of years until the bond matures.
Rating
Bond rating by Moody’s, sequentially converted to numbers from 1 (highest rating) to 5 (lowest rating), 
representing the ratings of Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, and Baa below. For issues without Moody’s rating, Standard & 
Poor’s rating or Fitch rating is used instead.
IssueHistory Number of years the issuer in the bond market. It is defined as the year of current bond issue minus year of initial public bond offering. 
OfferingD A dummy variable which takes the value of one if the issuer has completed the public bond offering in the last year and 0 otherwise. 
IssueExchange A dummy variable which takes the value of one if the issuer lists the bond on the NYSE and 0 otherwise. 
